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A Comparison of New Zealand
Taxpayers' Rights with Selected Civil
Law and Common Law CountriesHave New Zealand Taxpayers Been

"Short-Changed'?
AdrianJ. Sawyer*
ABSTRACT
This article seeks to ascertain the breadth of rights that
taxpayers enjoy in New Zealand in comparison with their
counterparts in a number of common law and civil law
jurisdictions. Such a comparison enables the wealth of
experience that codification of rights in civil law countries can
provide in comparison to the traditionally lower reliance on
statutory protection in common law jurisdictions. From this
comparative analysis common themes are distilled, as well as
differences between New Zealand and various civil law and
common law nations with respect to the legal position and
state of taxpayers' rights. The author mounts a strong
argument that New Zealand taxpayers have been shortchanged-in comparison with the selection of civil and
common law nations-from a legal (formalistic) perspective,
and more recently from an informal point of view. This
assertion is evidenced by the absence of a constitution
protecting fundamental human rights, minimalist legal
protection of rights through statutory means, and the poor
attempt at providing a charter of taxpayer rights.
Consequently, there is the possibility that a future
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government may ignore and override not only fundamental
taxpayers' rights, but also fundamental human rights. The
author concludes by strongly suggesting that it is better to
prevent the undesirablefrom happening ratherthan resting in
what may be a false comfort that a satisfactory level of
taxpayers' rights will remain through administrative
convention and informality.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Many countries are seeking to improve the service provided
to the taxpayer, in part because modem tax systems require
increased cooperation from the taxpayer if they are to operate
efficiently and also as a result of changing attitudes towards the
This
role of the tax administration vis-a-vis the taxpayer.
exists
cooperation is more likely to be forthcoming if mutual trust
between the taxpayer and the administration and if the taxpayer's
rights are clearly enumerated and protected. 1

1.
See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS: A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL SITUATION IN OECD

COUNTRIES para. 1.4 (1990) [hereinafter OECD SURVEY].
Taxpayers' Rights

and

Obligations, 1990

INTERTAX

See also Jeffrey Owens,
554

(discussing and

summarizing OECD SURVEY, supra); P. Gjesti, Taxpayers' Rights and Obligations,in
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Taxpayers' rights, for individuals at least, should be seen in
the broader context of human rights where there are established
principles and an international collective understanding of
fundamental
human
rights. 2 In
particular,
there
are
international and European covenants on human rights that have
been adopted and widely ratified, including the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,3 the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 4 the

European Social Charter, 5 the European Convention on Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 6 the European Community
Treaty, 7 and various other U.N. agreements and treaties. 8
Organizations have been created to monitor and hear complaints
concerning these covenants and conventions by citizens of
member states. In sum, the process of stating and protecting
human rights is largely internationalized to a commonly accepted
standard in the developed world.
Furthermore, almost all
developed nations have legislated for basic fundamental rights
through a constitution, which provides the highest level of
protection that a legal system can offer.
The same conclusion cannot be reached for taxpayers'
rights-a subset of human rights dealing with the tax

ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE ROLE OF TAx
REFORM IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIES 77 (1991).
2.
This idea was alluded to in the OECD SURVEY, supranote 1, para. 2.6,
although I develop it further in this article.
3.
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.
4.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
5.
European Social Charter, Oct. 18, 1961, 529 U.N.T.S. 89.
6.
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221; 45 AM. J. INTL L. 24
(Supp. 1953).
7.
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY, Feb. 7, 1992, 0. J. (C
224) 1 (1992), [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 573 (1992) [hereinafter EC TREATY].
The
European Community is now known as the European Union. For a discussion on

human rights in the European Union, see John P. Flaherty & Maureen E. LallyGreen, FundamentalRights in the European Union, 36 DUQ. L. REV. 249 (1998).
8.
This includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
217(III)A, U.N. GAOR (Resolutions, Part 1), at 71; U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); 43 AM.
J. INT'L L. 127 (Supp. 1949). For a useful collection of international human rights
instruments, see generally RICHARD B. LILLICH, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
INSTRUMENTS: A COMPILATION OF TREATIES, AGREEMENTS AND DECLARATIONS OF
ESPECIAL INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1990).
See also American
Convention on Human Rights (Pact of San Jose, Costa Rica) (Nov. 22, 1969)
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36; 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970); 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 679 (1970); Protocol to
the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights (Pact of San Salvador), Nov. 17, 1988, O.A.S.T.S. No. 69; 28 I.L.M.
156 (1989).

1348

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:1345

administration and government on tax-related matters. 9 As the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
observes,' 0
a
clear statement of taxpayers' rights and
accompanying protection will be positive in terms of enhancing
taxpayers' collective levels of compliance and providing a
mechanism for taming ever more powerful tax administrations.
To date, no international statement of taxpayers' collective rights
exists, and the release of such a statement is not imminent.
Indeed, the OECD's report illustrates that its member nations

have differing views on the rights they are willing to offer to their
taxpayers.11
Many of the rights that taxpayers may enjoy arise in the

context of basic human rights, a discussion of which is beyond
the scope of this article. This article, however, will highlight the
importance of providing rights for taxpayers both in dealing with
revenue authorities and in relation to basic fundamental human
rights.
Consequently, it is opportune to ask the question,
"Should there be a separate statement of taxpayers' rights in
addition to statements of basic human rights?" The answer,
submitted here, is in the affirmative and is twofold. First, many
of the rights taxpayers should be able to enjoy are too specific to
be set out in a higher level covenant or code of human rights or,
for that matter, in a constitution, since they relate to dealing with
the tax administration and associated issues. 12 Second, as will
be demonstrated later in this article, not all nations in the
OECD13 provide for the same protection of their taxpayers. In

9.
The subsequent discussion focuses upon natural persons as taxpayers
and their rights, as distinct from corporate taxpayers and other non-natural
person organizations, such as trusts, partnerships, and other forms of
unincorporated entities.
10.
See OECD SURVEY, supra note 1, para. 1.4.
11.
See id. paras. 3.44-3.65 (discussing taxpayers' rights in member
countries with references to tables containing taxpayers' rights and obligations).
12.
However, there are many rights that taxpayers should be able to enjoy,
such as the right to equality and to certainty of law, that are candidates for
inclusion in a constitution, international covenant or convention, or both.
13.
However, the OECD argues that notwithstanding the absence of a

taxpayer charter, countries "attach equal importance to taxpayers' rights and that
in practice taxpayers in such countries have rights similar to those set out in
these charters." OECD SURVEY, supra note 1, para. 2.14. As this article will show,
it is now difficult to retain confidence in the accuracy of this assertion.
Furthermore, this is in addition to the fact that non-OECD member nations who
rely on the levying and collection of tax revenues to fund government differ in
respect of rights provided to their taxpayers. The 29 OECD member countries at
the end of 1998 were: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.
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short, in the absence of any international statement or covenant
on taxpayers' rights, taxpayers cannot-and perhaps should
not-expect consistent treatment in their affairs from nation to
nation. While substantive tax legislation differs from country to
country as a result of national sovereignty in determining tax
policy and law, it is my contention that the basic taxpayer rights,
as set out in Parts II and III of this article, should be substantially
similar. For instance, while national human rights laws differ in
legislative style, most developed countries and many developing
nations have endorsed international covenants and conventions
setting out basic human rights and freedoms, notwithstanding
the underlying differences in substantive law between these
nations. 14
Why, therefore, have a readily accessible statement, either in
the form of a charter, declaration, or code, setting out taxpayers'
rights?
The simple answer, in my view, is that it enables
taxpayers to be aware of their rights and the obligations and
standards that can reasonably be expected of them, which
arguably is a fundamental right in itself. Furthermore, such a
statement will assist in enabling taxpayers to meet their tax
obligations with more certainty' s and to be more confident when
dealing with the revenue authority, including handling disputes.
In an environment of globalization of trade, finance, and business
activities, taxpayers are increasingly involved in activities that
come to the attention of revenue authorities outside of their own
country of principal residence.' 6 That is, taxpayers are coming to
the attention of revenue authorities in the countries in which they
have a presence.' 7
Generally accepted standards of tax
administration conduct and taxpayers' rights, in my view, would
serve to facilitate the growing phenomenon of globalization.

14.
See generally International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (1966), supra note 3, at 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (1966), supranote 4, at 171. A discussion of the differences in substantive
laws is beyond the scope of this article.
15.
Arguably, this is in itself a fundamental right.
16.
For a general overview of economic globalization and its impact on
taxation policy and taxpayers generally, see Jeffrey Owens, Taxation Within a
Context of Economic Globalization, 52 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 290
(1998).

17.
"Presence" means a potential or actual tax liability arising by virtue of
the taxpayer's residency status or a permanent establishment, or income sourced
in that jurisdiction. While a discussion of these important international tax
principles is beyond the scope of this article, see generally RICHARD L. DOERNBERG,
INTERNATIONAL TAXATION INA NUTSHELL (3d ed. 1997); ARVID AAGE SKARR, PERMANENT
ESTABLISHMENT: EROSION OF A TAX TREATY PRINCIPLE (Series on International
Taxation No. 13, 1991); Richard J. Vann, InternationalAspects ofIncome Tax, in 2
TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING 718 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1998).
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The intent behind this article is to ascertain the breadth of
rights that taxpayers in one common law country, New Zealand,
enjoy in comparison to their counterparts in a number of
The comparison of
common law and civil law jurisdictions.
selected civil law and common law jurisdictions enables the
wealth of experience that codification of rights (or offering
fundamental legislative protection) in civil law countries can
provide in comparison to the traditionally lower reliance on
Given my
statutory protection in common law jurisdictions.
experience with New Zealand's position on taxpayers' rights, this

article is able to offer not only a valuable comparison

of

taxpayers' rights in a number of OECD member nations,
including those of both civil law and common law extraction, but
also a perspective on a nation internationally represented as a

leading promoter and protector of human rights.1 8

However, as

this article will argue, New Zealand provides noticeably less

protection in statutory form for taxpayers than an observer would
reasonably expect, given the (overstated) high regard for New
Zealand as both a protector of, and advocate for, highly developed
universal human rights. 19
An important limitation must be indicated at the outset.

This article does not purport, and could not hope, to provide a
comprehensive comparison and detailed statement of the current
nature and state of taxpayers' rights in all developed civil law and
common law nations, many of which are members of the OECD.
Therefore, not only is this study limited to a subset of civil law

18.

See, e.g., Fostering Human Rights, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Oct. 29, 1998,

at 4 (recent editorial concerning New Zealand's prominent role in globalizing
human rights with respect to the United Nations Charter of Human Rights and
Freedoms).
19.
This argument is illustrated by the rather mediocre (average) score of a
"B+" for New Zealand in terms of human rights in a review conducted by the New
Zealand Human Rights Commission. See NZ Gets a 'B-plus' on Human Rights,
CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Feb. 20, 1999. For a useful review of New Zealand's human
rights record to 1994, see Margaret Bedggood, Constitutionalising Rights and

Responsibilities in Aotearoa/New Zealand, 9 OTAGO L. REV. 343, 343-44 (1998).
For an in-depth discussion on human rights in New Zealand, see Colin Aikman,
New Zealand and the Origins of the UniversalDeclaration,29 ViCT. U. WELLINGTON
L. REV. 1 (1999); Don MacKay, The UN Covenants and the Human Rights
Committee, 29 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 11 (1999); Judge Anand Satyanad, The
Ombudsman Concept and Human Rights Protection,29 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV.
19 (1999); Sir Kenneth Keith, Roles of the Courts in New Zealand in Giving Effect to
InternationalHuman Rights-With Some History, 29 VicT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 27
(1999); Sir Geoffrey Palmer, Human Rights and the New Zealand Government's
Treaty Obligations,29 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 57 (1999); Andrew S. Butler &
Petra Butler, The Judicial Use of InternationalHuman Rights Law in New Zealand,
29 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 173 (1999).
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and common law nations, 20 but it also does not consider
taxpayers' rights in nations in which both human and taxpayers'
rights are likely to be an issue of grave concern, such as a
number of developing (or emerging) nations and some former
socialist or communist nations (or transition nations). Rather,
this article will focus on New Zealand taxpayers' rights in the
context of interrational standards of taxpayers' rights.
The
comparison draws upon the experience of a number of well21
developed industrial common law and civil law countries.
Part II of the article provides a brief summary of the status of
taxpayers' rights in several civil law jurisdictions, namely Austria,
Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and Switzerland. Part III
considers the position in several common law nations, namely
Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, 2 2 the United
Kingdom, and the United States. The material in both Parts II
and III will draw upon international comparative work prepared
under the auspices of the International Bureau for Fiscal Documentation 23 and the OECD. 24 The discussion will focus on the
main subject of this article-New Zealand-in Part IV, where a
more in-depth analysis will be undertaken with respect to taxpayers' rights and obligations. Part V will distill from the preceding
discussion common themes as well as differences between New
Zealand and other OECD nations (comprising selected civil law
and common law nations), with respect to the legal position and
state of taxpayers' rights.

20.

This study is further limited largely to reviewing only a subset of OECD

member nations.

A number of European civil law nations that are OECD

members are excluded from this comparative study, including the Czech Republic,

Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Norway, Poland, Portugal, and Turkey.

Other

OECD member countries that are excluded are Mexico and the Republic of Korea.
21.
All but one of the countries included in this study are current OECD
members, the exception being South Africa.
22.
South Africa has a mixed jurisdiction of civil law and common law. For
the purposes of this article, it is treated as a common law nation, since its legal
and cultural origins prior to it becoming a republic are as a former British Colony
and member of the British Commonwealth.
23.

See INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF FIscAL DOCUMENTATION, LA PROTECTION DU

CONTRIBUABLE [TAXPAYER PROTECTION] (1989 [hereinafter IBFD]. The contributing
authors to this international study are: Kurt Delyhaye, Austria; Thomas Neuner,
Belgium; Ole Bjorn, Denmark; Jean-Yves Mercier and Michel Noemie, France;
Karl-Heinz Mittelsteiner and Albert J. RE~dler, Federal Republic of Germany; Alain
Steichen, Luxembourg; C.P.A. Geppaart, Netherlands; Magin P. Mestres, Spain;
Bruno Scherrer, Switzerland; Robin M. Ivison, United Kingdom.
24.
See generally OECD SURVEY, supra note 1.
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II. TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS IN CIVIL LAW COUNTRIES

A. A ComparativeAnalysis
It is a trite statement that civil law countries are categorized
accordingly because of their common ideology and their greater
reliance on, and higher judicial (and scholarly) respect for,
codification of law in legislative form, including the elevation of
fundamental aspects of law to constitutional status. Numerous
other common characteristics exist, but a discussion is beyond
The largest concentration of civil law nations
this article. 2 5
within the OECD are in Europe, hence the comparison of
taxpayers' rights in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Hungary, Japan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Spain,
The information contained in
Sweden, and Switzerland. 26
Appendices Al and A2 is intended to be illustrative rather than
indicative of important taxpayer rights for a selection of civil law
nations, which are provided through characteristic legislative
protection rather than through reliance on the vagaries of
27
administrative procedures.

25.
See generally JOHN H. MERRYMAN, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF WESTERN EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA (2d ed.
1985); HERBERT HAUSMANINGER, THE AUSTRIAN LEGAL SYSTEM (1998).
26.
Luxembourg is a member of the OECD but did not contribute to the
OECD report, see OECD SURVEY, supra note 1, para. 1.6, while Hungary did not
Both countries, nevertheless, are civil law
become a member until 1996.
countries that offer important perspectives on taxpayers' rights and are therefore
included in this comparative analysis. All of the European civil law nations
reviewed are members of the European Union with the exception of Hungary and
Switzerland. Japan, while not a European nation, adopted the civil law system in
the late nineteenth century. See Hiroshi Oda, Introduction, in JAPANESE
COMMERCIAL LAW INAN ERA OF INTERNATIONALIZATION 1, 1 (Hiroshi Oda ed., 1994).
27.
The two tables (Appendices Al and A2) are developed from the
comparative work of the IBFD, the OECD, and a feature on taxpayers' rights
appearing in the 1997 issue of the Revenue Law Journal. See generally IBFD,
supra note 23; OECD SURVEY, supra note 1; Daniel Deak, Taxpayer Rights and
Obligations: The Hungarian Experience, 7 REVENUE L. J. 18 (1997) [hereinafter
Deak (1997)1; Anders Hultqvist, Taxpayers' Rights in Sweden, 7 REVENUE L. J. 43
(1997)[hereinafter Hultqvist (1997)]; Ruud A. Sommerhalder, Taxpayer Rights in
the Netherlands, 7 REVENUE L. J. 58 (1997). See also Koji Ishimura, The State of
Taxpayers' Rights in Japan, 7 REVENUE L. J. 164 (1997) [hereinafter Ishimura
(1997)]. The Revenue Law Journal feature has also been updated in part through
a further publication on taxpayers' rights. See generally Daniel Deak, Taxpayer
Rights and Obligations: The Hungarian Experience, in TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS: AN
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE [hereinafter TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS] 200 (Duncan Bentley
ed.,1998) [hereinafter Deak (1998)] (no significant changes noted on taxpayers'
rights in Hungary, except for the extension of the jurisdiction of the Commissioner
of the Protection of Privacy to fiscal matters in 1997); Anders Hultqvist, Taxpayers'
Rights in Sweden, in TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS, supra, at 298 [hereinafter Hultqvist
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The information in Appendices Al and A2 may be
summarized into several fundamental categories of taxpayers'
rights that are constitutionally protected and available to
taxpayers in eleven of the twelve civil law countries featured. 28
These categories are as follows:
(1)
(2)

(3)

the right to be informed, assisted, heard, and
29
treated impartially;
the right to a hearing and subsequent appeal
against any decision of the tax authority
concerning application and interpretation of
the facts, the law, and administrative rulings
when the taxpayer is directly concerned;
the right to pay no more than the correct

amount of tax with respect to the taxpayer's

share of the relative tax base and the
30

(4)

taxpayer's personal circumstances;
the right to certainty as to the tax
consequences of the taxpayer's actions prior
to undertaking such actions, although this is
limited to the extent that complex tax
systems will allow, and is subsequent to

(1998)] (no significant changes noted on taxpayers' rights in Sweden); Ruud A.
Sommerhalder & Edward B. Pechler, Protection of Taxpayer Rights in the
Netherlands, in TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS, supra, at 310 (no significant changes noted on
See also Koji Ishimura, The State of
taxpayers' rights in the Netherlands).
Taxpayers' Rights in Japan, in TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS, supra, at 227 [hereinafter
Ishimura (1998)] (no significant changes noted on taxpayers' rights in Japan). In
this publication, there was a feature on taxpayers' rights in Germany that has
been used to update the data for Germany. See Claudia Daiber, Protection of
Taxpayers' Rights in Germany, in TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS, supra, at 152. A study on
Croatia is also included in this publication as an example of a developing country,
See Hrvoje
which has paid little attention to protecting taxpayers' rights.
Arbutina, Taxation in Croatia: Developments in the Field of Taxpayers' Rights and
Obligations,in TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS supra, at 138.
28.
Japan excepted from this specific constitutional protection of
taxpayers' rights.
29.
This includes an entitlement for taxpayers to have up to date
information on the operation of the tax system, access to representation by a
qualified professional, knowing how their tax is assessed, being informed of their
rights including appeal rights, and receiving courteous and efficient treatment.
However, these rights are not necessarily available to taxpayers in Japan to the
same extent. See Ishimura (1997), supra note 27, at 167-68.
30.
In France, if a taxpayer has been shown to have exercised good faith,
as opposed to bad faith (a common doctrine to civil law nations such as Austria,
France, and Germany), only minimal monthly interest of 0.75% will be charged (in
certain circumstances, nil), as opposed to interest at 0.75% plus a 40% (or 80%
for abuse of law or fraud) penalty. See CLAUDE GAMBIER & JEAN-YVES MERCIER,
FRANCIS LEFEBVRE'S TAXES INFRANCE para. 893 (1990).
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taking action through limitations on the time
in which an (re)assessment may be made;
the right to privacy such that tax authorities
will not intrude into taxpayer's private lives
unnecessarily, including limits on searches
3
and seizure of property; '
the right to confidentiality and secrecy of
information provided to the tax authority and
the right that such information will be used
only as permitted by law;3 2 and

(7)

the right to arrange one's affairs in such a
manner as to minimize liability to taxation,
provided that such arrangement does not
amount to fraud or contrived and artificial
arrangements.

Japanese taxpayers' rights are not presented in any formal
document. Furthermore, it has been asserted that taxpayers
have very few stated rights in Japan and that the revenue
authority has the upper hand.3 3 Thus, in comparative terms
Japanese taxpayers are in a demonstratively worse position than
taxpayers in the other civil law nations reviewed here. Only the
level of mutual trust and goodwill prevents a "meltdown" in
Japanese taxpayer/revenue authority relations. In the prevailing
conservative environment in Japan, in spite of widespread calls
for improvement from academics and the zeirishi,3 4 there remains
35
a reluctance to legislate positively to protect taxpayers' rights.

Traditional jurisprudence requires that any rights will be
accompanied by corresponding obligations on the other party, in
this situation the revenue authority.3 6 However, in order to
enable the revenue authority to provide taxpayers with an
environment in which their rights may be protected and upheld,
taxpayers have obligations. These obligations normally include
providing returns or information, either directly or through the
medium of third parties. 3 7 Taxpayers will lose many of these

31.
Secrecy is of great importance to Luxembourg and Switzerland-it is
pivotal to the operation of their legal and banking systems.
32.
This also embraces issues of dissemination of knowledge, professional
confidentiality (including privilege), and third party information.
33.
See Ishimura (1997), supranote 27, at 167.
34.
See id. at 165. Zeirishi are certified tax accountants who are actively
involved in tax practice.
35.

See id. at 210. Ishimura argues that the protection of taxpayers' rights

has to be realized as an international obligation of the government in Japan.

36.

See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 8, art.

29(1); Bedggood, supra note 19, at 348-49.
37.
See OECD SURVEY, supra note 1, at 33-43, tbls. 5-6 (for taxpayers' and
third parties' obligations); id. at 44-46, tbl. 7 (for revenue authority obligations).
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rights when they are justifiably suspected of tax fraud or
evasion.3 8
In such situations, taxpayers' rights in civil law
nations will generally come under the fundamental rights of
39
persons accused of criminal offenses.
An additional common feature of these civil law nations is
that each has ratified and endorsed the various European
covenants and conventions on human rights and has
membership in the European Union. 40 Consequently, at least in
theory there is a higher level appeal mechanism above national
appellate bodies for constitutional issues arising in the context of
alleged infringements of a taxpayer's rights.
A further feature evident from Appendices Al and A2 is the
paramount role of legislation, including constitutional provisions,
in creating obligations and rights. Administrative action that is
not specifically provided for in legislation or in duly enacted
ordinances and decrees is potentially unconstitutional and
subject to challenge. Consequently, there are more stringent
controls on the executive branch of government while the
legislature
enjoys
a
greater supremacy,
although
one
commentator has asserted that there are weaknesses in either
legal and constitutional protection 4 ' or unjustified breadth in
administrative power available to revenue authorities. Access to
an ombudsman (with either general or special tax jurisdiction) is
becoming increasingly common, although Belgium, Germany,
Hungary, Japan, and Switzerland 4 2 have yet to provide this
feature.
One area where the rights of taxpayers are far from
homogenous in the civil law countries, which are also members of
the OECD, is in providing notification to the taxpayer of an
information request-whether from a third party or another
government-or notification of a proposed reassessment or audit.
This is illustrated clearly at the bottom of Appendices Al and A2.

38.
39.

See id. para. 2.10.
See e.g., GAMBLER & MERCIER, supra note 30, paras. 897-98.

40.

The exceptions are Hungary and Switzerland, which are not members

of the European Union, but have ratified the various European covenants and
conventions, and Japan, which is not a European country but has ratified
international covenants and conventions on human rights.
41.
One example is Luxembourg. See IBFD, supra note 23, at 121 (noting
that constitutional revision was imminent in 1989 and the establishment of a tax
court envisaged).
42.
At least this was the case at the time of the OECD comparative survey,
see OECD SuRvEy, supra note 1, para. 3.51, and as of 1996 in Hungary. See
Deak (1997), supranote 27, at 42.
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B. Chartersof Taxpayers' Rights
Apart from France 43 and Belgium, 4 4 no instances of a formal
charter or declaration of taxpayers' rights exist in any of the
OECD member civil law countries survey in this article. 45 In the
two instances of taxpayers' charters, the legislative "backing" for
each is noteworthy (although the forms of enactment differ) as
well as is the specific and narrow subject area of each charter. At
first instance this may seem surprising, yet on reflection, it
should not be so. A common feature of eleven of the civil law
nations reviewed in this article is that each is European and a
signatory to the various treaties, covenants, and conventions of
Europe, including the European Covenant on Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms. 4 6 Furthermore, as a civil law nation,
each country necessarily places a higher degree of reliance on
constitutional provisions, including fundamental human rights
that form part of each nation's constitution. The rights included
in Appendices Al and A2 represent either basic human rights
with particular application to taxpayers, or important rights that
are protected by legislation (i.e., supported by covenants and
conventions).

43.
In addition to a Taxpayer Charter (charte du contribuable), effective in
1987, there is legislation providing for freedom of access to administrative
documents and motivation of administrative decisions. See OECD SURVEY, supra
note 1, at 70, tbl. 15. This Taxpayer Charter was established by way of
administrative practice and deals primarily with taxpayers' rights in the case of
audits.
44.
See Frans Vanistendael, Legal Framework for Taxation, in 1 TAX LAW
DESIGN AND DRAFTING 15, 30 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1996) (referring to the 1986
decision in Belgium to introduce a taxpayers' charter (Law of Aug. 4, 1986, B.S.
11.408 (Aug. 20, 1986)). This taxpayers' charter focuses on concerns relating to
tax fraud with tax officials previously co-operating with the public prosecutor's
office.
45.
According to the OECD, only taxpayers in the Netherlands may take
advantage of official mechanisms to access information, in this instance the

Govemient Information (Public Access) Act, 1987 (Neth.). See OECD SURVEY,
supranote 1, at 70, tbl.15.
46.
See European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, supra note 6. Japan is the only exception-it is not a
European nation.
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TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS IN COMMON LAW COUNTRIES

A. A ComparativeAnalysis
In comparison with civil law nations, common law nations
place a greater reliance on the role of common law, or judge-made
law (as opposed to simple "interpretation") for the operation of the
legal system. 47
This does not imply that statutory law is
relegated in importance; indeed, as with civil law nations,
statutory law (including constitutional provisions) occupies the
highest position of legal status. Another common feature among
common law nations is that many have their origin in the
common law of England as it has developed since 1066, following
48
colonization or settlement by immigrants of English extraction.
The largest concentration of common law nations within the
OECD are outside of Europe. The comparison of common law
country taxpayers' rights undertaken in this article embraces the
jurisdictions of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, South Africa, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. 4 9
The information
contained in Appendix B is intended to be illustrative rather than

indicative of important taxpayers' rights by the selection of
common law nations that subscribe to these rights through more
reliance on both judicial protection and administrative
procedures.5 0

47.
48.

See MERRYMAN, supranote 25, at 1-5.
A.D. 1066 was the time of the Norman conquest and commencement of

the development of early Anglo-Saxon law.
Numerous other common
characteristics exist, but a discussion is beyond the scope of this article. See id.
at 3.
49.
Note that New Zealand, also a common law nation, is considered indepth separately in Part IV of this article but is included in Appendix B for
completeness. South Africa is not a member of the OECD, although it is possible
it will become a member in the medium term future. Nevertheless, South Africa
offers a unique perspective of a nation that has radically reformed its human
rights legislation, including taxpayers' rights, in the last few years following the
move from apartheid to a democracy incorporating a new constitution, and has a
mixed civil law/common law jurisdiction for its legal system. It should also be
noted that the United Kingdom is not a uniform collection of nations (England,
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland) in terms of legal systems, since Scotland
utilizes a civil law system, while England employs a common law system. The
discussion in this article focuses on the system applicable in England.
50.
This is based on the comparative work of the IBFD, the OECD, and a
feature on taxpayers' rights appearing in the 1997 issue of the Revenue Law
Journal. See IBFD, supra note 23, at 183-209; OECD SURVEY, supra note 1;
Karen Wheelwright, Taxpayers' Rights in Australia, 7 REVENUE L.J. 226 (1997)
[hereinafter Wheelwright (1997)]; Jinyan Li, Taxpayers' Rights in Canada, 7
REVENUE L.J. 83 (1997) [hereinafter Li (1997)]; Andrew Alston, Taxpayers' Rights in
New Zealand, 7 REVENUE L. J. 211 (1997) [hereinafter Alston (1997)]; Bob
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The information in Appendix B may be summarized into
several fundamental categories of taxpayers' rights that are
available to taxpayers in each of the six common law countries
featured. These categories are as follows:
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

Williams,

the right to be informed, assisted, heard, and
S
treated impartially; '
the right to a hearing and subsequent appeal
against any decision of the tax authority
concerning application and interpretation of
the facts, the law, and administrative rulings
where the taxpayer is directly concerned;
the right to pay no more than the correct
amount of tax with respect to one's share of
the relative tax base and one's personal
5 2
circumstances;
the right to certainty as to the tax
consequences of one's actions prior to
undertaking such actions, although this is
limited to the extent that complex tax
systems will allow, and is subsequent to

Taxpayers' Rights in South Africa, 7 REVENUE L.J.

1 (1997); Abe

Greenbaum, Taxpayer Bills of Right I and 2: A Charterto be Followed by the Rest of
the World or Just Another Attack on the Tax Authority?, 7 REVENUE L.J. 138 (1997).
There was no discussion of the U.K. position on taxpayers' rights in the Revenue
Law Journal feature. The Revenue Law Journal feature has been updated by a
further publication in 1998 on taxpayers' rights. See Karen Wheelwright,
Taxpayer's Rights in Australia, in TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 57
[hereinafter Wheelwright (1998)] (no significant changes noted for Australia);
Jinyan Li, Taxpayers' Rights in Canada, in BENTLEY, supra note 27, at 89, (no
significant changes noted for Canada); Andrew Alston, Taxpayers' Rights in New
Zealand, in TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 267 (no significant changes noted
for New Zealand); Robert C. Williams, Taxpayers' Rights in South Africa, in
TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 282 [hereinafter Williams (1998)] (no
significant changes noted for South Africa, except for the enactment of the final
constitution and the taxpayer charter of rights); Abe Greenbaum, United States
Taxpayer Bills of Rights 1, 2, and 3: A Path to the Future or Old Wine in New
Bottles?, in TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 347 (the only important change
being discussion on the third 'taxpayer bill of rights' for the United States). There
is also a chapter on taxpayer rights in the United Kingdom that has been used to
update the materials for the United Kingdom.
See David Williams, United
Kingdom Tax Collection: Rights of and Against Taxpayers, in TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS,
supranote 27, at 331.
51.
This includes an entitlement for taxpayers to have up to date
information on the operation of the tax system, access to representation by a
qualified professional, knowing how their tax is assessed, being informed of their
rights including appeal rights, and receiving courteous and efficient treatment.
52.
However, in the case of New Zealand, one-half of the tax in dispute
must be paid up-front pending final resolution of the dispute.
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taking action through limitations on the time
S3
in which an (re)assessment may be made;
the right to some degree of privacy such that
tax authorities will not intrude into
taxpayer's
private
lives
unnecessarily,
including limits on searches and seizure of
property; however, the level of constitutional
protection of basic rights, including privacy,
54
is not homogenous across these countries;
the right to confidentiality and secrecy of

information provided to the tax authority and
(7)

the right that such information will be used
only as permitted by law;5 5 and
the right to arrange one's affairs in such a
manner as to minimize liability to taxation,
provided that such arrangement does not
amount to fraud, contrived and artificial
arrangements, or tax avoidance.

Traditional jurisprudence requires that a right will be
accompanied by a corresponding obligation on the other party, in
However, as is the
this situation the revenue authority.5 6
situation for the selected civil law nations reviewed earlier, in
order to enable the revenue authority to provide taxpayers with
an environment in which their rights may be protected and
upheld, taxpayers have obligations. These obligations normally
include providing returns or information, either directly or
through the medium of third parties. 5 7 Taxpayers will lose many
of these rights when they are (justifiably) suspected of tax fraud
or evasion, and avoidance.5 8 In such situations, taxpayers' rights

Certainty as reflected in a simple, as opposed to a complex, tax system
53.
is a right generally not available to taxpayers in the common law countries
featured in this article. Also, non-statutory material is frequently elevated to a
status close to legislation.
54.
The extent of these rights is varied across the six nations surveyed,
and it is difficult to arrive at any common consensus.
55.
This also embraces issues of dissemination of knowledge, professional
confidentiality, including privilege, and third party information. These rights of
privilege are normally restricted to legal professional privilege although there are
greater rights given to confidentiality of tax matters involving accountants in the
United Kingdom and United States.
56.
See generally Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 8;
Bedggood, supranote 19.
57.

See OECD SURVEY, supranote 1, at 33-43, tbls. 5-6.

58.
On occasions taxpayers may lose their rights-such as the right to the
presumption of innocence and to a fair and competent audit-when there is no
justifiable reason for suspicion of fraud, evasion, or avoidance by the taxpayer,
with minimal opportunity for redress or punishment of the revenue authority. For
instance, in New Zealand the recent debacle concerning a taxpayer by the name of
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in common law nations will, like their civil law counterparts,
generally come under the fundamental rights of persons accused
of criminal offences.

59

Access to an ombudsman (with either general or special tax
jurisdiction) is becoming increasingly common, although Canada
has yet to provide this feature. 60

One area in which the rights of

Henderson, who claimed a Goods and Services Tax (GST) refund of approximately
$60,000 for his business, and had this refund turn into a tax shortfall in the
millions of dollars, is a poignant example of this situation. The tax shortfall was
then reversed and the original refund claim accepted by the revenue authority,
but this occurred after the Inland Revenue Department had bankrupted the
taxpayer. While such issues would normally remain confidential, the internal
strife within the Inland Revenue Department, and frustration felt by the taxpayer
led him to discuss the case with a prominent opposition Member of Parliament
(Rodney Hide), who then exposed the issue in Parliament. A judicial review of the
Inland Revenue Department's audit process was sought, but this was refused by
the Minister of Finance and Revenue at the time, notwithstanding evidence
suggesting blatant lies by revenue authority officials (as a result of taped
telephone conversations challenging various public statements by revenue
officials), internal cover-ups, and the like. For a full exposition of the debacle, see
the autobiography by the taxpayer concerned, DAVE HENDERSON, BE VERY AFRAID:
ONE MAN'S STAND AGAINST THE IRD (1999).
In the context of the Inland Revenue Department's relationship with New
Zealand taxpayers, see N.Z. COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TAX COMPLIANCE, TAX
COMPLIANCE: REPORT TO THE TREASURER AND MINISTER OF REVENUE BY A COMMITTEE
OF EXPERTS ON TAX COMPLIANCE paras. 16.37-16.41 (1998). For a brief comment,
see Report Seeks Relaxation of IRD Secrecy, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Feb. 24, 1999, at
9.
59.
Furthermore, with respect to the rights of a person charged with a
criminal offence, there are more variations across the common law nations than
the civil law nations. For instance, the common law nations do not have access to
the European Court of Justice or the European Court of Human Rights, the
exception being the United Kingdom.
60.
See OECD SURVEY, supra note 1, para. 3.51.
Canada provides for
protection of taxpayers through the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, see CAN. CONST.
(Constitution Act, 1982) pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms), the
Declaration of Taxpayers' Rights, see Revenue Canada, DECLARATION OF TAXPAYER
RIGHTS (1987)(visited Oct. 23, 1999) <http://wwlv.rc.gov.ca/-paulb/index98/engish/
t4116ed5.htm> ("Index to Revenue Canada Services"), and the Fairness legislation of
1991 (this refers to amendments to the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, 5th Supp.)
(Can.), discussed further in Part III.B of this article dealing with Canada), which goes
some distance towards remedying the absence of an ombudsman for taxpayers. For
an interview with new Australian tax ombudsman Catherine McPherson, see David
Evans, Catherine Wheels, 33 TAX'N IN AUST. 300 (1998-99). Continued calls for a tax
ombudsman in New Zealand are receiving a mixed reception, notwithstanding a 50%

increase in complaints about the Inland Revenue Department in the last year. See
Michael Rentoul, Labour Wants Inquiry into 1RD, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Feb. 5. 1999, at
2. However, it is unlikely that New Zealand will get a specialist tax ombudsman in the
light of the Commissioner of Inland Revenue's views expressed in his report to the
Inquiry into the IRD recently conducted by the Finance and Expenditure Select
Committee of the New Zealand Parliament. See FEC INQUIRY INTO THE POWERS AND
OPERATIONS OF THE INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENTr GOVERNMENT RESPONSE ON POLICY
ISSUES AND INLAND REVENUE RESPONSE ON ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES, pt. II, paras. 262-74
(visited Oct. 23, 1999) <http://www.ird.govt.nz/resource/fec/brief-mgs/parttwo.html>
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taxpayers are more homogenous in the common law countries
(and clearly evidenced in Appendix B) than the civil law countries
is the notification of the taxpayer of an information request
(whether a request from a third party or another government) as
well as the notification of a proposed reassessment or audit.
Apart from the United States, minimal specified statutory rights
are given to taxpayers-or in other words, minimal obligations are
imposed on the revenue authorities. Therefore, for the eighteen

nations surveyed, there appears to be more diversity in taxpayers'
rights in the common law nations than in their civil law
counterparts (Japan excepted), although taxpayers' rights in the
civil law nations should not be considered to be completely
homogeneous.
B. Bills, Charters,and Declarationsof Taxpayers' Rights

1. Australia
The Australian Tax Office (ATO) formally introduced a
The
Charter of Taxpayers' Rights (Charter) in 1997.61
introduction of this Charter followed widespread debate and
public consultation on earlier proposals. 6 2 The Charter is a

[hereinafter FEC]. The report of the FEC was doubled in the New Zealand Parliament
on October 13, 1999. See FEC, INQUIRY INTO THE POWERS AND OPERATIONS OF THE
INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT-

REPORT OF THE FINANCE AND EXPENDITURE COMMITTEE

(visited Oct. 13, 1999) <http://www.gp.co.nz/wax/I-papers/ind-inquiry.html>.
Recommendation 19 requests the government to establish a specialist tax advisor
position within the Office of the Ombudsman, with appropriate resources, to
investigate matters of tax administration by the Inland Reserve Department. See
Matthew Brocket, Complaints Over RD up 50%in Year, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, June 14,
1999, at 3. Notwithstanding this view, complaints to the ombudsman on the actions of
IRD personnel have increased over 50 percent over the past two years. See id.
However, one New Zealand ombudsman has not found the number of claims a
problem given the size of the IRD. See Ombudsman Finds No Problem with IRD,
CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, June 15, 1999, at 8. The New Zealand Privacy Commissioner,
Bruce Slane, has also been critical of the actions of the IRD in relation to secrecy of
See Bruce Slane, Tax Act Secrecy Rides Roughshod over
taxpayer information.
Individual Rights, INDEPENDENT, July 28, 1999, at 13.
61.
AUSTRALIAN TAX OFFICE, THE TAXPAYERS' CHARTER: YOUR RIGHTS, YOUR
OBLIGATIONS, HOW TO BE HEARD (1997) [hereinafter CHARTER]. An online version of
the Charter is available at <http://www.ato.gov.au/general/advanced/adv.htm>.
The Charter is an administrative document.
62.
The Charter was one of the principal recommendations from the Joint
Committee of Parliamentary Accounts. See JOINT COMMITTEE OF PARLIAMENTARY
ACCOUNTS, REPORT 326: AN ASSESSMENT OF TAX (1993), cited in Wheelwright (1998),
supra note 50, at 60. It was the Joint Committee's belief that formal statements
about the obligations and responsibilities of taxpayers should be balanced with a
formal acknowledgment of taxpayers' rights. These rights "are really no more
than the currently unstated expectations of ordinary taxpayers and common law
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glossy document written in plain English and laid out in manner
that should assist taxpayers in understanding their rights as well
as their obligations.
Key aspects of the Charter include
statements of legal rights and standards that taxpayers can
expect from the ATO, including the right to fair treatment and an
6 3
expectation that the ATO will inform taxpayers of their rights.
Complaints will be treated seriously, with clear statements of the
available avenues for resolving disputes.6 4 Important obligations
required of taxpayers are also provided at the end of the
65
Charter.
Bentley observes

that the

Charter

is

premised

on

an

environment of self-assessment, which necessitates that
66
taxpayers are aware of their rights as well as their obligations.
The resulting document has administrative backing to
supplement both existing rights provided for in legislation as well
as various administrative rights. None of the legal rights stated
in the Charter are new; each of the legal rights already existed,
although the Charter provides a convenient mechanism to bring
all such rights together in a form accessible to taxpayers. 6 7 While
the legislative rights are enforceable under statute or common

rights of citizens in their dealings with the State." Id. at 308 (quoted in
Wheelwright (1997), supra note 50, at 97).
63.
See CHARTER, supra note 61, at 6-18.
64.
See id. at 20.
65.
See id. at 2 1.
66.
See Duncan Bentley, Formulatinga Taxpayers' Charterof Rights: Setting
the Ground Rules, 25 AUSTL. TAX REV. 97, 98-100 (1996) [hereinafter Bentley
(1996)]. For an earlier discussion by Bentley concerning how the then proposed
Taxpayer Charter of Rights could be enforced in the light of experience in other
countries, see Duncan Bentley, A Taxpayer's Charter: Opportunity or Token
Gesture?, 12 AUSTL. TAX F. 1 (1995) [hereinafter Bentley (1995)]. For a more
recent exposition on taxpayers' rights, including a discussion on the possible
future directions of taxpayers' rights, see Duncan Bentley, Definitions and
Development, in TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS, supra note 27, at 1; Duncan Bentley,
Classifying Taxpayers' Rights, in TAXPAYERS' RGHTS, supra note 27, at 16; Duncan
Bentley, An Overview of Taxpayers' Rights, in TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS, supra note 27, at
35,
67.
See Wheelvight (1997), supra note 50, at 263 (discussing the Joint
Committee of Parliamentary Accounts' observations). These rights are accessible
to taxpayers if the measurement bases of comprehensibility and location are

utilized." However, I would argue that it is theoretically possible that the Charter
may recast existing legal and administrative rights in a manner such as to bring
into question whether these legal and administrative rights have been modified,
creating a claim of estoppel against the Commissioner for the legitimate
expectation that a taxpayer may rely on the rights as stated in the Charter. The
ability for "administrative" law-making through delegation from the Legislature to
the Executive brings into existence the possibility of sustaining this argument.
Note also the provisions of the Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act,
enacting the
Commonwealth
of Australia Constitution
of
1901. See
Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act, 1900, ch. I, 63 & 64 Vict., ch. 12
(Eng.); AUSTL. CONST., ch. I.
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law, administrative rights cannot be enforced directly by judicial
means but rather by administrative mechanisms-in this
instance, the Special Problem Resolution Unit. 68 Access to the
69
Tax Ombudsman is also an avenue for dissatisfied taxpayers.
Perhaps the strongest enforcement mechanism is the ATO's
genuine undertaking that it intends to stand behind the Charter,
foster a positive relationship with taxpayers, and resolve disputes
by problem-solving
rather than confrontation whenever
possible. 70 Ideally, for the greatest protection of taxpayers, a
comprehensive legal and administrative charter accompanied by
71
legal backing is necessary.
A large proportion of the rights represent second-order legal
rules and first-order administrative rules. 7 2 These include the
rights to fair and reasonable treatment, privacy, and
confidentiality of information. 73 Suggestions have been made for
a more extensive statement of legal and administrative rights,
including the right to natural justice and the right to
compensation for loss from actions taken by the ATO without
lawful authority or cause. 7 4 While rights of this nature have not
been included in the Charter, this should not be taken to mean
that rights of this nature do not necessarily exist. Consequently,
one critical aspect of the debate over what should be included in
a charter, in my view, is the public benefit that arises to
taxpayers who become aware of their actual rights when
particular rights are included.
Second-order administrative rights, concerning details of the
administrative process, are included in the Charter, 75 although
third-order administrative rights (or aspirational rights), which
76
are also included, cannot really be enforced by taxpayers.
Nonetheless, one commentator observes that the Charter falls
well short in terms of the ramifications for U.S. revenue officials
77
who undertake illegal acts.
In addition to statements of rights that directly bind the ATO,
access to information is another important feature of the system.

68.
See CHARER, supranote 61, at 20.
69.
See id.
70.
See id. at 5.
71.
See Bentley (1996), supra note 66, at 116.
72.
Bentley develops this process of ordering legal and administrative rules
as taxpayers' rights. See id. at 102. However, these are also first order legal
rights. See id. at 103-05.
73.
See id. at 102.
74.
See id. at 106.
75.
For a discussion on this type of rights, see id. at 109-10.
76.
See id. at 110-11.
77.
See Wheelwright (1997), supranote 50, at 264.
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In Australia, the Freedom of Information Act 78 provides taxpayers
with the right to request access to information that relates to
their affairs, including reasons for decisions, albeit with some
79
limitations.
One further positive outcome of the Charter should be
greater awareness by the taxpaying community of its rights,
which would indirectly create the impetus for ATO officers to
meet taxpayers' collective and individual expectations as
80
expressed in the Charter.
2. Canada
In Canada, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms 8 l contains a
number of substantive rights that directly affect taxpayers. These
rights include equality rights,8 2 the right to freedom of conscience
and religion,8 3 and the right to certainty of law.8 4 Specifically in
the context of taxation, the organization Revenue Canada
released the Declaration of Taxpayer Rights (Declaration) in
1985.85 This document, while only having administrative rather
than legal backing, is aimed at improving Revenue Canada's
credibility as well as taxpayers' collective perception of fairness in
the tax system. 8 6
Without legal backing, however, the

78.
See Freedom of Information Act, 1982 (Austl.).
79.
In addition, taxpayers may use the Privacy Act to gain access to certain
confidential information and can expect specified certain statutory protection of
their private information which is held by the ATO. See Privacy Act, 1988 (Austl.)
80.
A further positive aspect is the ATO's stated commitment to adopting a
problem-solving approach rather than confrontation in dispute resolution. ' See
CHARTER, supra note 61, at 5.
81.
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedom, supra note 60.
82.
Taxpayers have been successful in invoking the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms in the context of the deductibility of child care expenses, and various
marital and spousal equivalent deductions. See Li (1997), supranote 50, at 129.
83.
No Canadian taxpayers have successfully argued this right before a
court. See id. at 130.
84.
Li argues that certainty of law, being a fundamental aspect of the rule

of law, applies to taxpayers with respect to tax legislation, but only to the extent
that this applies to any other legislation according to the Canadian Constitution.
See Li (1997), supra note 50, at 131; CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), pt. I
(Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms).
She notes that no provision of
Canadian tax legislation has been declared void for vagueness or uncertainty,
although certainty is frustrated by the effects of retroactive legislation made
effective from the date of ministerial announcement. See Li (1997), supranote 50,
at 132-33.
85.
See Revenue Canada, supra note 60. This document has no legal
authority and provides no real protection for taxpayers. See Li (1997), supranote
50, at 85.
86.
In a similar manner to the ATO in Australia, this document is available
See Revenue Canada, supra note 60. This
on Revenue Canada's website.
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Declaration offers no legal protection; rather, it seeks to reshape
8 7
the attitude of Revenue Canada in its dealings with taxpayers.
The Declaration states that in dealings with Revenue Canada
on tax matters, taxpayers are entitled to complete and accurate
information about the Income Tax Act,8 8 to courteous and

considerate treatment, and to a presumption of honesty, unless
there is evidence to the contrary. One fundamental right referred
to in the Declaration is fair handling of a complaint. 8 9 Revenue
Canada is also required to assist taxpayers in exercising the full
range of their rights. Indeed, the Declaration refers to taxpayers'
rights as they appear in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and
the Canadian Constitution. 90 In effect, this document serves a
similar purpose to the Australian Charter, although it is less
detailed in terms of enumerating taxpayers' rights and providing
assistance to taxpayers seeking further information.
The Canadian Fairness legislation was released in 199191
with the intention of making the tax system "simpler, easier and
fairer" and Revenue Canada
"kinder and gentler."9 2
The
underlying intention of the legislation is to provide greater
discretion to Revenue Canada, which Revenue Canada can
exercise in favor of taxpayers. It is expected that this discretion
will be utilized for amending returns beyond the statute of
limitations in specific circumstances. 93
Therefore, Revenue
Canada can permit the late filing of returns and certain elections
in specified circumstances. 9 4 It can also waive or cancel interest
or penalties when they result from Revenue Canada's undue
delay or financial hardship, or from the first occurrence of late
remittance of source deduction taxes. 95 Taxpayers may also
apply for a judicial review of whether the Minister's actions are
fair in exercising discretion under the legislation. 9 6 A further

document represents only little more than one page containing a brief statement
of taxpayers' rights.
87.

See Li (1997), supranote 50, at 86.

88.

Income Tax Act, R.S.C., 5th Supp. (1985) (Can.) [hereinafter Income

Tax Act (Can.)].

89.

See Li (1997), supra note 50, at 86.

90.

CAN. CONST. (Constitution Act, 1982), pt. I (Canadian Charter of Rights

and Freedoms). See Li (1997), supra note 50, at 86.
91.
The legislation introduced a series of amendments to Income Tax Act
(Can.). For a discussion of the changes, see Robert M. Beith, FairnessPackage, 44
CAN. TAX FOUND. CONF. REP. 7:1 (1992).

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
R.S.C. ch.

Li (1997), supra note 50, at 135.
See Beith, supranote 90, at 72; Li (1997), supra note 50, at 135.
See Li (1997), supra note 50, at 135.
See id.
Canadian taxpayers may also utilize the Access to Information Act,
A-1 (1983) (Can.) and the Privacy Act, R.S.C. ch. P-21 (1983) (Can.) to
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positive development is simplification of the appeals process,
although it remains to be seen whether Revenue Canada's use of

to its "clients"
new terminology, which is now offering "services"
97
(i.e., taxpayers), will have long term benefits.
Notwithstanding its good intentions, the Fairness legislation

has been criticized for failing to improve substantive fairness in
the tax system by not providing relief to taxpayers who are
Indeed, this
unfairly treated in certain circumstances. 98
legislation has been inconsistently applied in various District
Taxation Offices without monitoring by Revenue Canada.
Concurrent with this practice is a lack of public accountability for
the amount of tax, interest, and penalties forgiven by Revenue
99
Canada under this legislation.
3. United States
The United States Omnibus Taxpayer Bill of Rights' 0 0 of
1988 (TBR1) and its 1996 amendments (TBR2), 10 in conjunction
with the latest revisions resulting from the Internal Revenue
Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (IRSRRA), appear
to contain a statement of taxpayers' rights, although one
commentator disagrees with respect to the former two legislative
initiatives.' 0 2 Abe Greenbaum argues that the title of the first
two Taxpayer Bill of Rights statutes act as misnomers and their
content does nothing to enhance or advance the rights of
taxpayers.10 3 In fact, Greenbaum concludes in very strong terms
when he states:

obtain access to their confidential information and to enforce the privacy of their
confidential information.
97.
See Li (1997), supra note 50, at 136. This issue also arose as part of
the Committee of Tax Experts Review of the New Zealand tax system. See N.Z
COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TAX COMPLIANCE, supranote 58, paras. 16.1-16.23.
Circumstances include situations of possible thoughtless or negligent
98.
conduct on behalf of Revenue Canada officials that have caused expense to a

taxpayer. See Li (1997), supra note 50, at 136.
99.
See id. at 137.
100. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100647, 102 Stat. 3342 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
TBR1].
101.
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (1996)
(codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter TBR2].
102.
Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub.
L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)
[hereinafter IRSRRA]. See also Taxpayer Bill of Rights 3, Pub. L. No. 105-206, tit.
3, 112 Stat. 726 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.) [hereinafter
TBR31. The third taxpayer bill of rights is further discussed in Greenbaum (1998),
supranote 50, at 366-79.
See Greenbaum (1997), supra note 50, at 139. This fact, argues
103.
Greenbaum, distinguishes TBRI and TBR2 from the legislative efforts in other
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[T]he legislative initiatives in TBR1 and TBR2 operate in a too
piecemeal and reactive fashion, when there was an opportunity to
establish a comprehensive and coherent program of taxpayers'
rights. It is tragic that an opportunity to advance taxpayers' rights
was missed in favour of a legislative program which was designed
primarily to promote an anti-government agenda. 104

Other commentators discussing TBR1 and TBR2 have been
far less critical; in fact, it would be more correct to suggest that in
at least one instance they have been supportive of the
changes.' 0 5 One group of taxpayers that appears to be unfairly
treated by TBR1 and TBR2 is third-party taxpayers.' 0 6 A better
in the
attempt at expressing taxpayers' rights has been made
07
Georgia state legislature with a proposed bill of rights. '

nations, where taxpayer bills of rights or charters systematically establish specific
rights and delineate limits on the tax administration. Greenbaum extends these
comments to TBR 3 (or IRSRRA). See Greenbaum (1998), supra note 50, at 34748.
See Greenbaum (1997), supra note 50, at 163.
104.
See Rita A. Cavanagh, The New Protections of the 'Taxpayers Bill of
105.
Rights 2'. Useful Changes Across the Board, 85 J. TAX'N 210, 214 (1996)
(discussing TBR2); Gerald A. Kaka, Taxpayer Bill of Rights Expands Safeguards
and Civil Remedies, 70 J. TAX'N 4, 9 (1989) (discussing TBR1); Gerald A. Kafka,
Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2 Offers Added Protection, 57 TAX'N ACCT. 196, 202 (1996).
However, in their comment on TBR1, Jones and Schleef offer similar sentiments
to Greenbaum, supra note 50, with comments such that TBR1 offers little in the
way of remedy against heavy-handed IRS tactics, and that it is questionable
whether it advances the position of taxpayers at all. At most, Jones and Schleef
argue, TBR1 is only marginally beneficial and will do little to restore confidence in
the U.S. income tax system. See Kaplin S. Jones & Joan E. Schleef, Omnibus
Taxpayer Bill of Rights: Curefor 'Seizure Fever'"or Election Year Placebo?, 68 MICH.
B. J. 480, 488-89 (1989); Kaplin S. Jones & Joan E. Schleef, Taxpayer Bill of
Rights Requires More IRS Disclosure and Expands Civil Remedies, 42 TAx'N FOR
AccT. 180, 184 (1989). Knight and Knight, arguing in the context of audits and
dispute resolution with the Internal Revenue Service, conclude that TBR2
provides welcome relief to taxpayers who seek to resolve disputes with the IRS.
See Lee G. Knight & Ray A. Knight, Dispute Resolution with the IRS and Taxpayer
Bill of Rights 2, 13 AKRON TAX J. 27, 80 (1997). Knight and Knight's study focuses
on the practical ramifications of TBR2 rather than the substantive issues and its
overall context. See generally id.
See generally Scott Petersen, The Rights of Third-PartyTaxpayers Under
106.
the Taxpayers' Bill of Rights, 1 J. SMALL & EMERGING Bus. L. 325 (1997) (arguing

that the legislative history of the Taxpayers' Bill of Rights suggests that third party
taxpayers were intended to receive protection). Third-party taxpayers are those
taxpayers who have their assets taken to pay someone else's tax liability.
See Susan J. Swinson, Legislative Review: Revenue and Taxation, 10
107.
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 215 (1993) (where key rights, set out in simple and nontechnical terms, will embrace the rights of taxpayers and the obligations of the
Commissioner during audits, appeal procedures, obtaining refunds and laying
complaints, and the procedures for filing and enforcing liens). Taxpayers may also
expect to receive fair, accurate, and courteous service from the revenue
authority-an "unwritten" right is to be put into legislation. Enforcement of this
rule, nevertheless, argues Swinson, will remain problematic.
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IRSRRA represents, inter alia, the most recent effort of
reforming the state of taxpayers' rights in the United States.
Major changes include restructuring the IRS into geographical
and taxpayer-type segments and alternating the administrative
hierarchy.1 0 8 This approach is not unique from an international
perspective, since the Australian, Canadian, and New Zealand
previously undergone
similar
revenue
authorities
have
reorganizations.' 0 9 Protection for IRS employee whistleblowers
has been included," 0 which indirectly provides a further
protection for taxpayers against revenue official misconduct and
taxpayer abuse."' Other positive moves for taxpayers' rights
include the directive to revise the publication Your Rights as a
Taxpayer in the context of the audit process." 2 Non-attorneys
who are federally authorized tax practitioners are to be on the
same level as attorneys with the ability to offer their clients
confidential
non-criminal
privilege
with
respect
to
communications. 1 13 Further protections have been included with
such
as
installment
to
collection
activities,
respect
114
arrangements.
Judicial proceedings have been made more favorable to
taxpayers by reversing the onus from the taxpayer to the
government

in

civil proceedings

in

which

the taxpayer has

produced credible evidence and certain conditions are met."
Other

changes

include

equalizing

the

interest

rate

5

on

108. IRSRRA, Pub. L. No. 105-206, §§ 1001-02, 1101-05, 1201-05, 112 Stat.
685, 689-723.
109. See Bentley (1996), supra note 66, at 115 (Australia); Li (1997), supra
note 50, at 136 (Canada); N.Z. COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TAX COMPLIANCE, supra

note 58, paras. 16.1-16.23 (New Zealand).
110. See IRSRRA §§ 3001, 3101-06.
111. For an exposition on the IRS' internal culture, staff relations, and
"ethics," see generally SHELLEY L. DAVIS, UNBRIDLED POWER: INSIDE THE SECRET
CULTURE OF THE IRS (1997). Davis, the first and last IRS official historian recounts
the bureaucracy, cowardice, pettiness, and vindictiveness of IRS personnel and
procedures.
112. See IRSRRA § 3502.
113. See id. §§ 3411-17, 3701-12.
114. See id. §§ 3421-68.
115. This portion of the IRSRRA arose out of complaints of IRS treatment
presented during Senate hearings under the leadership of Senator Roth, hearings
that have been described as biased and unrepresentative of IRS typical standards
of practice by former IRS Commissioner Margaret Milner Richardson. Margaret
Milner Richardson, Address at the University of Virginia School of Law (Nov. 2,
1998).
For a summary of Richardson's speech, see Legal Briefs: Margaret
Richardson Addresses Groups, 51 VA. L. WKLY., Nov. 6, 1998, at 6. In fact, this
legislation appears to exceed the reasonable balance between taxpayers' rights
and the effective administration powers that a revenue authority is entitled to
wield.
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overpayments and 1 6underpayments and on other penalty and
refund alterations.
However, notwithstanding the apparent positive attributes of
this legislation, particularly how it brings the IRS/taxpayer
relationship closer to that which prevails in Australia, Canada,
and New Zealand, at least one major drawback exists. Returning
to Greenbaum's observations over TBR1 and TBR2, IRSRRA is
not the result of a mutual IRS/Government initiative. Rather, it
exemplifies yet another instance of members of a Republicandominated Congress scoring political gain over the Democrat
minority as part of their agenda for reducing taxation, in this
instance under the guise of weakening the revenue collection
agency. Congress worsened the situation by imposing changes
without IRS support and cooperation, which is contrary to the
approach followed in Australia. Furthermore, IRSRRA contains
more instances of what appear to be genuine taxpayer rightsenshrined in legislation without any reference to taxpayer rights
in its title-than are in either TBR1 or TBR2." 7 Both TBR1 and

116.

In New Zealand, for example, a large differential between the over-

payment and under-payment rates has been maintained for several years; until
recently it was 6.43% percent. As from November 8, 1998, the differential has
been furthered increased to 7.69% following a reduction in both under-payment
and over-payment rates, reflecting to some degree the recent decline in world
market interest rates. However, from March 1, 1999, the differential was reduced

to 7.21% when a larger decline in the rate for under-payments will be made than
to over-payments by taxpayers. The differential is not supposed to be seen as a
penalty, according to the New Zealand Government and the Inland Revenue
Department, although I would argue-along with many other tax commentators
and advisers-that the facts clearly suggest otherwise. This rate differential
"forces" many taxpayers into making probable over-payments of tax since the
under-payment rate is considerably higher than prevailing market rates.
However, not all common law countries employ some form of a Use Of Money
Interest (UOMI) regime to encourage (voluntary) compliance. Currently, there is
no realistic opportunity for a significant reduction in the differential between
UOMI rates. See FEC, supranote 60, paras. 181-90. According to the Director of
Tax for the Institute of Chartered Accountants of New Zealand, the Inland
Revenue Department has been accused recently of overcharging interest by using
a compounding basis instead of simple interest on short paid provisional tax,
notwithstanding the clear intention of the New Zealand Parliament. See IRD
'Overcharging'Interest,CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Mar. 2, 1999, at 35.
For instance, TBR1 contains procedural provisions that were one
117.
subdivision of an even larger piece of legislation. TBR2 is also an omnibus bill
containing a variety of procedural issues. By way of contrast, IRSRRA provides
certain rights, as noted previously, including whistleblower protection and
extension of professional privilege. However, arguably it goes too far in placing
the burden of proof in court proceedings on the government when the taxpayer
produces credible evidence. See IRSRRA, Pub. L. No. 105-206, § 3001, 112 Stat.
685, 726. Greenbaum argues that other parts of the Internal Revenue Code offer
more protection for taxpayers than either of TBR1 or TBR2, and indirectly the
Constitution of the United States of America. Greenbaum (1998), supra note 50,
at 376. Greenbaum also argues that TBR3 (IRSRRA) effectively undermines the
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TBR2 were given the colloquial title of "Taxpayer Bill of Rights,"
suggesting that they comprise statements on taxpayers' rights,
but, as Greenbaum argues, they do not contain any real rights for
taxpayers.11 8 Nevertheless, the general thrust of the IRSRRA is

directed at including some items that could be included in a U.S.
taxpayer charter, if the United States was to pursue this
opportunity. However, IRSRRA by itself is not sufficient to form
the basis for a charter of taxpayers' rights.
4. Statements of Taxpayers' Rights in the Remaining Common
Law Countries
The enacted interim Constitution 119 and the recent new and
final Constitution of South Africa, 2 0° contain specific rights
protecting taxpayers in an accompanying Bill of Rights. These
rights include fundamental provisions, such as the right to
equality and privacy, access to information, administrative justice
12 1
(lawful and fair administrative action), and property rights.
Several tax provisions have been identified as being in conflict
with the interim Constitution and final Constitution, and the
anticipated outcome is a constitutional challenge. 122 Under the
previous apartheid regime, such rights were unavailable to the
majority of the population in all aspects of their lives quite apart
from tax-related matters. In 1997, a charter of taxpayers rights
was introduced in South Africa by the South Africa Revenue
Service, appropriately titled "Client Charter." It is a single folio of
23
thirteen points stated in general terms.'

IRS via the U.S. Congress attempting to run the IRS. See id. TBR1, argues
Greenbaum, is the closest to a coherent charter of taxpayers' rights. TBR 2 and
TBR 3 cannot be so characterized. See id. at 379.
118. See generally id.
119. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 200 of 1993 (interim
Constitution in force from Apr. 27, 1994).
120. Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Act 108 of 1996 (in force
from Feb. 4, 1997).
121. These rights were protected under Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, Act 200 of 1993, arts. 8, 13, 23-24, 28. See Williams (1997),.supra
note 50, at 8-10, 14-15. Now they come within Constitution of the Republic of
South Africa, Act 108 of 1996, arts. 9, 14, 25, 32-33. All rights are subject to art.
36(1), a general overriding limitation provision. See Williams (1998), supra note
50, at 287.
122. Williams (1997), supra note 50, at 11; Williams (1998), supra note 50,
at 295-96.
123. See Williams (1998), supranote 50, at 296-97. It appears, according to
Williams, to be an innocuous document (arguably much like the New Zealand
IRD's 'Customer Charter' discussed in Part IV of this paper), more noteworthy for
what it does not say than for what it does say.
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In the United Kingdom, a Taxpayer's Charter was introduced
in 1986.124 This brief document summarizes the basic
expectations that taxpayers may have of the Inland Revenue in
the United Kingdom. It is similar in content and size to Revenue
Canada's Declaration, although it makes no reference to any
125
constitutional provisions.
One common theme among taxpayer charters and similar
documents in the common law nations is that each represents an
approach to prohibiting arbitrary practices by the tax
administration against taxpayers. Only the U.S. attempts to have
the direct force of law through enactment by statute.
Interestingly, the U.S. approach is the only instance in the
common law nations surveyed in this article in which the tax
administration was not the most active party in preparing the
statement on taxpayer rights. 126
5. Dispute Resolution and Tax Courts
An international symposium on the role of tax courts in
dispute resolution in several civil law and common law countries
was held in 1988 in the United States. 12 7 From this symposium
emerged several observations pertinent to a review of taxpayers

rights.

First, in each system represented, the courts enjoy a

strong tradition of judicial independence, even when they form
part of the executive branch. 1 28 Australian taxpayers experience

124.

INLAND REVENUE, CHARTER FOR INLAND REVENUE TAXPAYERS (1999).

A

copy is available at the U.K. Inland Revenue's website: (visited Oct. 24, 1999)
<http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/pdfs/ir167.htm>. David Williams states that
this document cannot and does not claim to be a statement of rights. See
Williams (1998), supra note 50, at 335.
125. The United Kingdom does not have a formal constitution, although
there are protections provided through the Bill of Rights (1688), see Bill of Rights,
1 W. & M. sess. 2, ch. 2 (Eng.), reprintedin 10 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENGLAND
AND WALES 44 (4th ed. 1985), other legislative protection of rights that are
constitutional in nature, and various covenants and conventions, including the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, supranote 6.
126. This is with some justification given the contents of TBR1, TBR2, and
particularly IRSRRA are not entirely favorable from the IRS's perspective.
127. The report of the conference was prepared by Professor Paul B.
Stephan, where the countries represented included France, Germany, Japan, the
Netherlands, and Sweden from the civil law countries featured earlier in this
article, and Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States from the
common law countries featured in this article. See Paul B. Stephan III, Courts
with Income Tax Jurisdiction:An International Comparison, 8 VA. TAX REV. 233
(1988).
128. See id. at 235.
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the least specialized tax court system, 12 9 while Canadian and
New Zealand taxpayers can take advantage of the relative
informality of hearings. 130 Only in Canada can taxpayers as of
right postpone all of the tax alleged to be due pending the court
proceeding.131
The position of New Zealand has altered significantly since
the symposium, as a new dispute resolution process came in to
place on October 1, 1996.132

New Zealand has also since

implemented a new and even more informal small claims division
in the Taxation Review Authority,' 33 and a substantial number of
decisions by the New Zealand Taxation3 4Review Authority judges
were appealed and reversed on appeal.1
In the United States, with the choice of first instance 13 5 and
with the independent nature of the thirteen Federal Tax Court
circuits, disgruntled U.S. taxpayers possess a wide scope of
choice, including two appellate levels that conclude with the U.S.
13 6
Supreme Court.
Professor Paul B. Stephan's observation of the differences in
prerequisites for litigating a dispute and in the role of tax
advisors in the countries represented at the symposium
emphasizes that aspects of taxpayer rights are far from uniform
internationally. Since the symposium, significant developments
in the dispute resolution process have been enacted in Australia,
New Zealand (as noted earlier), and the United States.13 7

129.

Since this symposium, the Australian tax court system has been

refined and it now more closely resembles the New Zealand system for courts
lower in the hierarchy, albeit within a federal system.
130.
See Stephan, supra note 127, at 237, 242 (dealing with Canada and

New Zealand separately).
131.

See id. at 237.

132.
See Tax Administration Act, 1994, pt. IVA, amended by Tax
Administration Amendment Act (No. 2), 1996, § 11 (N.Z.).
133.
See Taxation Review Authorities Act, 1994, § 13B, amended by
Taxation Review Authorities Amendment Act, 1996, § 3 (N.Z.).
134.
This position is contrary to that reported by Stephan, supra note 131,
at 242, since in recent years, approximately 80% of decisions of the Taxation
Review Authority that are appealed are reversed on appeal (either by the High
Court or Court of Appeal), according to the presenters at the 1998 New Zealand
National "Facts on Tax" Seminars, run by the Tax Education Office, held at

Christchurch (at which I was present).

It appears that New Zealand taxpayers

have become more willing to dispute decisions of the TRA, and with some success.
135.
The three alternatives are the Tax Court, Claims Court and District
Court. See Stephan, supranote 127, at 243-44.
136.
See, e.g., PATRICIA T. MORGAN, TAx PROCEDURE AND TAX FRAUD IN A
NUTSHELL 118-19 (1990).
137.
For changes to the Australian system, see supra Part III.B.1, and for
the United States, see supra Part III.B.3. However, perhaps the greatest changes
have been in New Zealand, where outlier situations such as the maximum 300%
penalty of tax owed have been replaced by a conceptually new penalty structure
(in effect from April 1, 1997) with the highest penalty being 150% in the case of
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In contrast, the court systems in the civil law nations of
Germany, France, the Netherlands, and Sweden are closely tied
to the constitutional structure of each nation. In Germany, the
specialist tax court, the Federal Fiscal Court, acts as the
appellate and final authority over all tax disputes except for those
of a constitutional nature.1 3 8 The French and Swedish systems
are similar; disputes are taken through an administrative court
process, which includes an appellate process.' 3 9 The evidence
suggests that a significant number of tax cases are appealed in
Sweden. 140 The Dutch system, however, resembles something
more akin to the New Zealand system in its use of the regular
court system and its minimal scope for consideration of
constitutional issues in the tax arena. 14 1 In Japan, the National
Tax Tribunal deals with tax disputes only while aggrieved
taxpayers have the opportunity to appeal to the judicial
42
process.1

IV. TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS

IN NEW ZEALAND

The OECD study143 reports that New Zealand has a formal
statement, through a taxpayers' charter or declaration, the
Statement of Principles (SOP), issued in 1986.144 This document,
however, is not in the traditional style of a charter, but, as its title
suggests, it sets out a number of principles designed to
encourage voluntary compliance with the tax system. It does not
contain any taxpayers' rights per se, other than the statement
that the New Zealand Inland Revenue Department (IRD) aims "to

civil evasion, see Tax Administration Act, 1994, § 141E (N.Z.), and increased to
175% where obstruction of the Commissioner is
established. See Tax
Administration Act, 1994, § 141K (N.Z.). Criminal evasion is punishable by up to

five years imprisonment, a fine up to NZ $50,000, or both. See Tax
Administration Act, 1994, § 143B (N.Z.).
138. See Stephan, supra note 127, at 238. It is arguable that issues
involving taxpayers rights, if they come within human rights generally, would be
able to be appealed to the Federal Constitutional Court.
139. See id. at 238-39; GAMBIER & MERCIER, supra note 30, paras. 920-30.
140. See Stephan, supra note 127, at 243 (discussing the appellate
jurisdiction of Swedish courts).
141. See id. at 241.
142. See id. at 240. With the lack of taxpayer rights in any formal sense in
Japan, this bias in favor of taxpayers is a positive concession on one hand, but
equal opportunity for appeals from both sides is jurisprudentially preferable. See
Ishimura (1997), supranote 27.
143.
See OECD SURVEY, supranote 1.
144. The OECD report indicates 1986, but the Statement of Principles was
published by the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) in January 1984. See INLAND
REVENUE DEPARTMENT, STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES (Publication Information Bulletin
No. 123, 1984).

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

1374

[Vol. 32:1345

make it as easy as possible for people to comply with the tax
laws, by letting them know their rights and obligations." 45 The
SOP also suggests that taxpayers can expect the law to be
administered in a consistent, courteous, and prompt manner so
that everyone knows they are treated fairly. 14 6 However, there is
no reference to any statutorily enforceable rights in the Statement
of Principles. Subsequent to the SOP, the general principles as
enunciated in the SOP and details of a client service focus were
announced in 1988.147
The IRD has set out its Customer Charter providing
taxpayers with information regarding the standards of service
they can expect. 14 8 This sets out a number of rights and
obligations, several of which have the backing of legislation as
second-order legal rights (and as first-order administrative
rights).14 9 The remaining are administrative rights of the secondand third-order. 5 0° The rights set out are as follows:
(1)
(2)

145.

Your right to good service-You are entitled to
prompt, courteous, and efficient service from
5
Inland Revenue.' '
Your right to confidentiality-We will respect
the information you give us, and use it for
lawful purposes only.'s 2

Id. This implies that taxpayers must look elsewhere to find details of

their rights, with the IRD undertaking to let taxpayers know where to find a

reference to their rights.
146. See Bentley (1996), supranote 66, at 109-11. A combination of second
order administrative and third order (aspirational) administrative rights.
147.

See INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT,

PRESS RELEASE: TAX OFFICE-NEW

APPROACH, (Publication Information Bulletin No. 173, 1988).

Other changes in

administration have occurred within the IRD since 1988, although they have
received more attention in the IRD's Annual Report to the New Zealand
Parliament, a publicly available document.
148. INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, ANNUAL REPORT 1995-96 at 6 (1996). This
Customer Charter is displayed in all IRD offices, although there are fewer and
fewer offices left following downsizing. Interestingly, the Customer Charter was
not reprinted in the 1996-97 Annual Report (or in any subsequent Annual
Reports), which leaves taxpayers unsure as to whether the IRD still intends to
honor the charter. See, e.g., N.Z. COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS ON TAX COMPLIANCE, supra
note 58, paras. 16.1-16.23 (discussing the IRD's efforts at changing from a
paradigm of taxpayer to "customer" in 1995, and the Committee's concerns over
this change in focus); id. paras. 16.24-16.31 (espousing the public's
misconception over use of the IRD's motto "It's our job to be fair").
149. This classification is based on Bentley (1996), supranote 66, at 103-09,
in his discussion of the Australian Charter.
150. See id. at 109-11.
151. A combined second-order administrative and third-order administrative
right. See id.
152. A combined second-order legal and first-order administrative right.
See id. at 106. There have been alleged breaches of this right recently by a
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Your right to be believed-We will presume
that you are honest in your dealings with us
However,
unless we believe otherwise.
to
check
sometimes we are required
53
information you give us.1
Your right to individual attention-You are
entitled to know the name5 4 of the staff
member you are dealing with.'
Your right to help-We will give you the
your
information you need to understand
ss
rights, and to meet your obligations.'
Your right to question our decisions-If you
ask, we will explain how to object to any
assessment or decision we make.'15

number of IRD personnel, and the matter is under investigation. See Probe into
The
Standards of IRD Staff, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Nov. 13, 1998, at 9.
Commissioner of Inland Revenue has publicly admitted to breaches of the secrecy
obligations by some staff during the Parliamentary investigation of the IRD. See
1RD Admits Secrecy Slip: Mistakes Made, Says Head, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Apr. 22,
1999, at 11; see also Tax Administration Act, 1994, § 6(2)(c), (e), where one
function of the Commissioner is to protect the integrity of the tax system, and Tax
Administration Act 1996, § 6A(2)(c), (e) (N.Z.), placing the care and management of
the tax system, and duty to collect the highest net revenue over time, with the
Commissioner.
153. A third-order administrative right. See Bentley (1996), supra note 66,
at 110.
154. A third-order administrative right. See id. at 110. I would argue that it
is peculiar that this provision is included as a separate right and not subsumed
into the first right to good service; there are much more fundamental rights that
could be stated. Inclusion of this right leads to the conclusion that IRD staff
members need reminding to give their name to taxpayers! However, with further
impending office closures and redundancies of over 800 staff (over 25% of the
existing equivalent fulltime staff) with the advent of 1.2 million taxpayers not
having to file a tax return, a significant number of taxpayers will be unable to get
individual attention in person. Instead, reliance on an automated telephone
service and minimal Internet access will be the avenues for "individual" attention.
See IRD Staff Face Job Losses as Offices Close, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Feb. 10,
1999, at 9; David Gee, SI Tax Jobs, Services Cut, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Mar. 16,
1999, at 3. The IRD has responded to some of these accusations, stating that
they are exaggerated. For instance, the number of employees is to be reduced by
600-700, not 1000 as claimed by the New Zealand Public Service Association. See
Inland Revenue Responds to PSA Statements, SMART TAX WKLY. BULL., Apr. 20,
1999, at 2. One fallout from this downsizing may be taxpayers receiving larger
penalties upon an audit that yields a tax shortfall discrepancy, since the time
from filing the return to the audit may be several years longer. See IRD Needs
Flexibility on Penalties-Expert,CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Feb. 15, 1999, at 30.
155. A combined second-order administrative and third-order administrative
In my view, it is
right. See Bentley (1996), supra note 66, at 109-11.
disappointing that the rights about which taxpayers will be given information are
not set out in a separate charter or declaration that is displayed in IRD offices and
is readily available to taxpayers.
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Your rights if you are audited-If you are
selected for a tax audit, then we will explain
S
your rights and obligations to you. 1 7
Your obligation to act honestly-You are
obliged to act honestly in dealing with Inland
Revenue (for example, by disclosing all your
income in your tax return). 1 5 8

While New Zealand taxpayers cannot refer to an extensive
charter or declaration like their Australian counterparts, 5 9 there
are statements referring to a number of rights in disparate
locations. This is certainly not a taxpayer-friendly situation. If a
charter were to be developed-in my view, the Australian Charter
should be a useful reference point-the following components
should be included. Taxpayers should, at a minimum, have the
right to confidentiality, a notice of revenue authority action,
reasonable audits, explanations, counsel, recording meetings,
discovery of evidence, a hearing before adjudication of a decision,
160
appeals, and statutory limits on periods for assessments.
Currently, legislation in New Zealand sets out taxpayers'
obligations in succinct yet all-embracing terms. 16 1 Nevertheless,
in the face of submissions suggesting the need for balancing

obligations with rights for taxpayers (or obligations on the

156. A combined second-order legal and first-order administrative right.
See id. at 106. However, in my view it is undesirable from a taxpayer's perspective
that they must initiate the process of inquiring as to their rights in this respect
rather than being pre-empted by the IRD official.
157. A combined second-order legal and first-order administrative right.
See id. It would be preferable that taxpayers have access to such information
before committing to a decision that may have future audit implications (Le., pretransaction and filing certainty).
158. This is an obligation that is normally expected of taxpayers in order to
be entitled to their rights. It is really a subset of the right to be believed rather
than being a separate statement of an obligation (as opposed to a right).
159. This situation also applies, although to a lesser degree, with respect to
New Zealand taxpayers' counterparts in Canada and the United Kingdom.
160. See Richard K. Gordon, Law of Tax Administration and Procedure, in 1
TAX LAW DESIGN AND DRAFTING 111-12 (Victor Thuronyi ed., 1996).
These
suggested areas are based primarily on rights provided in the United States'
Internal Revenue Code rather than any separate document detailing taxpayers'
rights.
161. See Tax Administration Act, 1994 § 15B (N.Z.). These obligations
include correctly determining the amount of tax payable (which necessitates
certainty of law), correctly deducting and withholding tax, paying tax on time,
keeping all necessary information and accounts, disclosing to the Commissioner
in a timely and useful manner as required to by law, cooperating with the
Commissioner as required to by law, and complying with all other obligations (a
catch-all provision). See Adrian J. Sawyer, Taxpayer Compliance, Penalties and
Disputes Resolution Bill: An Update, 50 BULL. FOR INT'L FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 72,
73 (1996).
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Commissioner), the New Zealand government decided not to
1 62
enact any legislative protection in the form of taxpayers' rights.

162. This decision was the recommendation of the Finance and Expenditure
Select Committee, reporting on the Taxpayer Compliance, Penalties and Disputes
Resolution Bill, 1996 (N.Z.), to Parliament following public submissions and
consultation on the Bill. I offered a different approach in my submission on the
Bill in which I recommended some form of statutory balancing for taxpayers.
However, the Select Committee was satisfied that a balance in favor of the
Commissioner was justified, but it limited the scope of the original proposed
obligations for taxpayers to be those required by the tax laws.
The decision of the Government to accept the Select Committee's
recommendation appears to have been il-conceived; the IRD can no longer waive
penalties but must force payment, including bankrupting the taxpayer, an
approach mandated by Parliament (or in at least once instance driving a taxpayer
to commit suicide for a debt that grew to NZ $85,000 in six years, and another
"almost giving up" after receiving a bill for NZ $46,000 on an original debt of NZ
$12,000). See MPs "Responsible'forIRD Approach, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Feb. 8,
1999, at 11; Rentoul, supra note 60, at 2; see also Bullying by IRD 'Led to
Suicides CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Sept. 30, 1998. The new legislative regime reflects
a decision to enforce taxpayer obligations to a point that may force the taxpayer to
take their own life while refusing to offer any legislative protection for taxpayers
rights. See Victoria Clausen, Despairfor Tax Debtors: Woman Considers Suicide,
CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Feb. 4, 1999. For an instance of a taxpayer 'needlessly'
losing their business at the hands of the IRD, see Man Lost His Business After IRD
'Vendetta; CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, June 10, 1999, at 10. Furthermore, it has been
alleged that recent legislation has been introduced to retrospectively validate an
extension for the IRD to investigate taxpayers where court hearings were in
progress where the underlying issue was that the period in which the IRD could
issue an assessment had expired. A prominent New Zealand constitutional lawyer
believes this action breaches the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990 (N.Z.) and

constitutional law and signifies that Parliament will rush in to aid the
Commissioner but do nothing for taxpayers. See IRD Bill 'Breaches Rights, Law',
CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Feb. 11, 1999, at 3. In response, the Minister of Revenue
has referred to some of the claims against the IRD as being outrageous, such as
the claim that a NZ $84 tax debt could spiral to NZ $85,000 in six years. See
Some Claims About IRD Outrageous-Minister,MARLBOROUGH EXPRESS (Blenheim),
Submissions to the FEC inquiry into the
Feb. 1999 (on file with author).
operations and powers of the IRD have now finished and the FEC has deliberated
over the evidence and submitted its report on October 13, 1999. For a copy of the
government's and IRD final report to the FEC, see generally FEC, supra note 60.
The FEC made 27 recommendations that are summarized in Appendix C of this
Article. For details of one of the most comprehensive submissions made to the
FEC, see Jeff Owens, Institute Response to Tax Inquiry, 78 CHARTERED ACCT. J. 57
(1999).
The FEC inquiry heard its evidence in public but deliberated in
confidence. The FEC had requested the authority of the New Zealand Parliament
to carry over its deliberations to after the November 1999 General Election. See
Ian Llewellyn, !RD Inquiry Likely to Continue After Election, INDEPENDENT, Sept. 8,
1999, at 10. For a detailed examination of one taxpayer who was recently made
bankrupt by the IRD, and who gave evidence to the inquiry, see Matt Philp, The
Grim Reaper, LISTENER, July 31, 1999, at 28. See also RODNEY HIDE, THE POWER
TO DESTROY (1999) (discussing some of the "shocking" revelations of IRD
harassment and abuse made during the FEC Inquiry into the IRD).
The level of media interest in the FEC inquiry has been immense. The
following articles are a sample of the more recent issues raised by way of written
or oral evidence presented during the inquiry: Rodney Hide, IRD Officers Should
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What this failure to legislate fails to recognize is that tax
compliance, fundamental to a self-assessment system, is a two-

way process necessitating rights and obligations for both the
Commissioner and taxpayers to be clearly stated. 1 63 The rights
preferably should be stated in legislative form or at least in an

administratively-binding

charter

of taxpayers'

rights. 16 4

A

suggestion has been made that taxpayers' rights could be
legislated in New Zealand, modeled on the then-proposed
5
Australian Charter of Taxpayers' Rights. 16
Confounding the situation is that there is no formal
constitution in New Zealand that, inter alia, protects fundamental
human rights, including rights applicable to taxpayers. 16 6 On

Payfor Their Own Mistakes, NAT'L Bus. REV. (Auckland), Jun. 11, 1999, at 22; Rob
Hosking, Tax Inquiry: Firm Suggests 'Proxy PAYE System' for Reoffenders, NAT'L
Bus. REV. (Auckland), June 11, 1999, at 6; Jock Anderson, Tax Victims Confront
Inland Revenue over 'Harsh'Treatment, NAT'L Bus. REV. (Auckland), June 11, 1999,
at 6; Jenni McManus, Top Taxman Blows Whistle on IRD's "DisastrousErrors",
INDEPENDENT, June 16, 1999, at 22; RD officer 'Bragged over Suicides',
CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, June 17, 1999, at 9; Allegations Against IRD Eroding
Confidence, Commissioner Says, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, June 18, 1999, at 7; Rob
Hoskng, Tax Victims: At Last, a Little Levity Reaches the Tax Inquiry, NAT'L Bus.
REV. (Auckland), June 18, 1999, at 11; Punitive IRD 'Counter-Productive',
CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, June 23, 1999, at 6; Jenni McManus, !RD Stalling Screws
Unsecured Creditors, INDEPENDENT, June 23, 1999, at 23; Rodney Hide, IRD Kicks
Taxpayer in His HospitalBed, NAT'L Bus. REV. (Auckland), June 25, 1999, at 22;
Jock Anderson, 'Found' Legal Aid File Crucial to Tax Victim, NAT'L Bus. REV.
(Auckland), June 25, 1999, at 6; Chris Hutching, Tax Probe MPs Pick over Hendo
Evidence, NAT'L Bus. REV. (Auckland), June 25, 1999, at 15; Rob Hosking, Tax
Lawyer Calls IRD a Lending Institution, NAT'L Bus. REV. (Auckland), June 25, 1999,
at 15; IRD Accused of Perjury, Forgery, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, July 1, 1999, at 25;
Collin Espiner, IRD Targets Cheh Sex Trade, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, July 20, 1999,
at 3; Matthew Brockett, The Taxman Who Wanted Free Sex, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS,
July 22, 1999, at 3; Jo Doolan & Catherine de Cleene, Sauce for the Goose Isn't
Sauce for the IRD's Vultures, INDEPENDENT, July 28, 1999, at 15; Rodney Hide, Like
Baking and Travel? Join IRD's Special Audit, NAT'L Bus. REV. (Auckland), Aug. 13,
1999, at 26; Rodney Hide, Fight Begins to Reverse Burden of Tax Proof, NAT'L Bus.
REV. (Auckland), Aug. 20, 1999, at 19.
163.
See Adrian J. Sawyer, TAAC-15B [Taxpayer's Tax Obligations], in
BROOKER'S SMART TAx COMMENTARY: UPDATE (1999).

164. See id.
165. The proposed Australian Charter of Taxpayers' Rights was not adopted
entirely as recommended by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts, but the ATO
released its Charter in 1997. See generally CHARTER, supra note 61; see also
Sawyer, supranote 163, at 74 (proposing a new § 15C should be added to the Tax
Administration Act).
166. This position is unique among the common law nations I surveyed in
this article, since for taxpayers in the United Kingdom, in the absence of a written
constitution and an entrenched bill of rights, there is protection provided through
membership to the European Union and various European covenants and
conventions. By way of an analogy, consider the discussion on the implications of
entrenching a bill of rights in the United Kingdom and how effective this process
may be for providing protection against hasty or casual amendments. See
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first reading, this could be interpreted as suggesting that New
Zealanders have little in the way of legal protection of their rights.
In a strictly purest constitutional interpretation this position is
true, although several important pieces of legislation have been
enacted since the late 1980s. The first major milestone was the
Constitution Act, 167 which was designed, with reference to the
long title to the Act, to reform New Zealand's constitutional law
and to separate effectively New Zealand from its colonial past by
removing it from the overall control of the United Kingdom
starting on January 1, 1987.168 The Act was not afforded the
status of constitutional importance, since it only requires a
simple majority of the unicameral House of Representatives,
dominated by the Executive, to repeal it. The Constitution Act
sets out the powers and functions of the three branches of
state16 9 and the independence of each branch. The Act, however,
provides little in the way of real protection since the Executive,
through its dominance of Parliament, at least theoretically can

take action to repeal the application of the doctrine of the
170
separation of powers in New Zealand.
The second important statutory development, which is more
pertinent for taxpayers, was the enactment of the New Zealand
Bill of Rights Act, 17 1 which came into effect on August 28, 1990.

generally Anupam Chander, Note, Sovereignty, Referenda, and the Entrenchment of
a United Kingdom Bill of Rights, 101 YALE L.J. 457 (1991). Furthermore, I firmly
believe it would be abhorrent to the civil law nations reviewed in this article if
they had the choice to consider following New Zealand's example and attempt to
maintain their existence without a formal constitution. Furthermore, I would
expect common law nations to have a similar reaction if they were forced to
downgrade the status of their constitutions.
Constitution Act, 1986 (N.Z.).
167.
See id. at title.
168.
That is the Legislature (represented by the House of Representatives
169.
and Parliament, see id. §§ 10-22), the Executive (see id. §§ 6-9) and the Judiciary
(see id. §§ 23-24).
It should be noted that with a Mixed Member Proportional (MMP)
170.
parliamentary process in place and coalition governments (or more correctly,
currently a National Party led government dependent on the support of
independent Members of Parliament and several minor parties, the composition of
which is changing almost weekly), the Executive commands less power than
under the previous First Past the Post (FPP) system. For background discussion
to the MMP referendum proposal, see Mai Chen, Remedying New Zealand's
For
Constitution in Crisis: Is MMP Part of the Answer?, [1993] N.Z.L.J. 22.
discussion of the success or otherwise, and the operational aspects of MMP, see
generally SIR GEOFFREY W. R. PALMER & MATTHEW PALMER, BRIDLED POWER: NEW

ZEALAND GOVERNMENT UNDER MMP (1996); Philip Joseph, The New Parliament,
[19971 N.Z.L.J. 233 (discussing the structure and operations of the first MMP
parliament); Philip Joseph, Mrs. Kopu's Challenge to MMP, [19971 N.Z.L.J. 413
(discussing how this List MP left her party to become an independent and the
resulting constitutional implications).

171.

New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990.
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The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act is intended to affirm, protect,
and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms in New
Zealand and to affirm New Zealand's commitment to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 172 The New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act contains provisions typical of a bill of
rights, which one would justifiably expect to be granted
constitutional status.
Instead, this fundamental piece of
legislation is only a recent enactment, notwithstanding New
Zealand's international human right commitments. Furthermore,
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act may be amended by a simple
majority of Parliament, and it has no formal constitutional
3

protection. 17

Since the enactment of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act,
the Human Rights Act' 7 4 was enacted in 1993 not only to
consolidate and amend existing race relations law, but also to
provide better protection of human rights in New Zealand in
accordance with the United Nations' Covenants and Conventions

172.

See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supranote 4.

173. A special majority of 75% of Members of Parliament is not required to
amend or repeal the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act. Furthermore, New Zealand
courts are not permitted to hold that any enactment is impliedly repealed or
revoked, or to decline to apply a provision, for the sole reason that it is
inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, which illustrates the lack of
constitutional status of this legislation. See New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 1990,

§ 4.
Perhaps the most relevant right for taxpayers in the New Zealand Bill of Rights
Act is the right to freedom from discrimination, as provided in section 19, and the
search, arrest, and detention rights (sections 21-27) that could apply in the case
of perious tax fraud. Other more remote rights in the context of protests relating
to taxation issues include the right to peaceful assembly (section 16), right to

freedom of association (section 17), and the right to freedom of movement (section
18). All rights are subject to justified limitations. See New Zealand Bill of Rights

Act, 1990, § 5 (providing for subjection of these rights to "reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic

society").
Furthermore, several scholars have expressed grave concern over the
effectiveness of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act following recent judicial
interpretation and application. See, e.g., Scott Optican, Search and Seizure: An
Update on s 21 of the Bill of Rights, [1996] N.Z. L. REV. 215; Andrew S. Butler, The
End of Precedent and Principle in Bill of Rights Cases? A Note on R v. Grayson,
[1997] N.Z. L. REv. 274; Paul T. Rishworth, Human Rights and the Bill of Rights,
[1996] N.Z. L. REv. 298; Anna Adams, Competing Conceptions of the Constitution:
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 and the Cooke Court of Appeal, [19961 N.Z.
L. REV. 368. Recently, there has been a suggestion that the Bill of Rights Act is
effectively dead. See Hart Schwartz, The Short Happy Life and Tragic Death of the
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, [1998] N.Z. L. REV. 259. For a recent discussion on
the search and seizure provisions of the New Zealand Bill of Rights, see Scott
Optican, Search and Seizure in the Court of Appeal-An Essay on the Uses and
Misuses of Section 21 of the Bill of Rights, 18 N.Z. U. L. REV. 411 (1999).
174. Human Rights Act, 1993 (N.Z.).
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on Human Rights. 17 9 This legislation complements the New
Zealand Bill of Rights Act, but offers no greater protection than
the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act with respect to human rights,
including taxpayers' rights.
In the area of disputes or disagreement over information,
(in
appropriate
have
access
taxpayers
New
Zealand

circumstances)

to

confidential

information

via the Official

1 76

and, more recently, enjoy greater protection
Information Act
through the enactment of the Privacy Act. 177 One further area in
which taxpayers may exercise their rights is by taking a case to
the Ombudsmen, as provided in the Ombudsmen Act.17 8 This
Act sets up the ombudsmen process in a similar manner to other
international jurisdictions and has been used on rare occasions
In the absence of formal
by taxpayers in New Zealand. 17 9

175.
The United Nations' Covenants and Conventions on Human Rights in
this context refers to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights, supra note 3, and International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
supra note 4. Once again, the Human Rights Act may be repealed by a simple
majority of the New Zealand Parliament. Furthermore, there is no constitutional
status afforded to this critical piece of human rights legislation. Interestingly, the
Human Rights Act provides that by December 31, 1998, a report must be
prepared by the Human Rights Commission to the Minister of Justice setting out
the Commission's examination of all relevant rules and regulations, and whether
any rules or regulations infringe the spirit or intention of this Act. See Human
Rights Act 1993, § 5(i)-(j) (N.Z.). For a brief commentary on the prescribed review
(entitled Consistency 2000) that was abandoned when half-completed, see
The Chief
generally NZ Gets a 'B-Plus' on Human Rights, supra note 19.
Commissioner of the Human Rights Commission, Pamela Jefferies is reported as
stating that "[i]n New Zealand there's no excuse for not getting an A for human
rights." Id. Nevertheless, according to Jefferies New Zealanders can feel confident
that in most areas our laws are pretty consistent with the Human Rights Act. See
id.
Official Information Act, 1982 (N.Z.) (see especially sections 4-6 on the
176.
scope and limitations of the Act).
177.
Privacy Act, 1993 (N.Z.) (see especially section 6 setting out the privacy
principles). The implications of both the Official Information Act and the Privacy
Act and difficulties experienced by New Zealanders coming up against the Privacy
Act as reported in the media are beyond the scope of this article. The former
provides access to official information, maldng it more easily available where this
is in the public interest to do so.
178.
Ombudsmen Act, 1975 (N.Z.) (see especially section 13 for the
functions of the ombudsmen.) For a discussion on the office of the Ombudsmen
in New Zealand, see Judge Anand Satyanand, The Office of Ombudsman in New
Zealand, 6 CANTERBURY L. REv. 470 (1997). Judge Anand Satyanand is a New
Zealand Ombudsman.
179.
See Alston (1997), supra note 50, at 223-24. The author discusses a
case, in which he was an advisor, concerning three visiting university teachers
who succeeded in their complaint not to pay taxes for which they were previously
advised by the IRD would not be payable. The recommendations for payments to
compensate for the tax due that was paid by each of the three academics were
made ex gratia,with the amounts modified slightly so as not to exactly mirror the
tax payments made. See id.
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protections and a statement of rights, the IRD provides a variety
of useful explanatory booklets on particular taxpayer rights, such
as the investigation and audit process and the new dispute
resolution process. 180

V. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

All of the civil law nations reviewed in this article have a
formal constitution setting out basic fundamental human rights,
including, either by implication or direct reference, taxpayer
rights. Furthermore, in each instance, taxpayers have redress to
various international and European covenants and conventions
detailing human rights. It is not surprising, therefore, that with
the preference for statutory law over administrative regulation,
few of the civil law nations surveyed in this article have adopted a
separate taxpayer charter or declaration of taxpayer rights.
Common law nations, in contrast, are more likely to have some
form of charter or declaration of taxpayers' rights, normally an
administrative document of varying scope and value, instigated at
the volition of the revenue authority (the United States being the
exception).
Out of all of the nations reviewed, Japanese
taxpayers have the least form of protection of their rights and
demonstrably so; accordingly, there is pressure for reform of this
unacceptable situation.181

From a formalistic perspective-which has been the
approach taken in the preceding discussion-this analysis of the
state of taxpayers' rights in New Zealand implies that New
Zealand taxpayers fare worse than traditionally comparable
developed common law nations such as Australia, Canada, and
the United States. Not surprisingly, New Zealand taxpayers
generally fare worse than the civil law nations reviewed in this
article, with the exception of Hungary and Japan. Since Hungary
is just transitioning from a socialist environment to a developing
(or emerging) nation with recent OECD membership status, its
status is not surprising. Interestingly, however, Japan offers by
far the least protection for taxpayers out of all of the
industrialized nations reviewed in this article. New Zealand
taxpayers, and for that matter, New Zealanders in general, do not

180. These documents may be viewed at the IRD's website. See Inland
Revenue, Publications(visited Oct. 24, 1999) <http://www.ird.govt.nz/resource/
publicat/index.htm>.
181.
See Ishimura (1997), supra note 27. However, it should be also be
recognized that taxpayers' rights in South Africa have not been significantly
tested, as of the date of writing, under the interim Constitution or the final
Constitution.
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have the protection of a formal constitution or any legislation that
requires a special majority or referendum in order to alter
fundamental rights.1 8 2 Development of a formal constitution for
New Zealand has numerous implications, a discussion of which is
beyond the scope of this article.' 8 3
Nevertheless, the
international experience would suggest that reliance on a
benevolent government that dominates Parliament to adhere to
fundamental rights is extremely risky, even for a traditionally
conservative nation.

The reference in the OECD report 18 4 to a New Zealand
charter or declaration of taxpayers' fights-the Statement of
Principles-not only falls well short of the Australian Charter, but
it also lacks the content that several scholars advocate as critical
for an effective charter.' 8 5 The New Zealand government's focus
has been on strengthening taxpayers' obligations while
86
deliberately opting not to provide for taxpayers' rights.'
Nevertheless, the Tax Administration Act' 8 7 and the Taxation
Review Authorities Act' 8 8 set out critical (and largely procedural)
rights of taxpayers,' 8 9 including the following provisions:
confidentiality of information; 190 restrictions on conducting

182. There is one exception in the former Electoral Act, 1956 (N.Z.)-where
section 189 is entrenched-that requires a special majority of the New Zealand
Parliament to repeal certain other provisions of this Act, including the process of
altering the electoral system. This provision is now section 268 of the Electoral
Act, 1993 (N.Z.).
The value of this provision (former section 189, and by
implication, new section 268) is questionable since the Act as a whole may be
repealed by a simple majority of the unicameral Parliament! For a discussion on
such issues, see Philip A. Joseph, Constitutional Entrenchment and the MMP
Referendum, 16 N.Z. U. L. REV. 67 (1994).
183. For further discussion on a formal constitution for New Zealand, see
Bedggood, supra note 19, at 352-53; see generally PALMER & PALMER, supra note
170.
184.
See OECD SURVEY, supranote 1, at 70, tbl. 15.
185.
See generally Bentley (1996), supra note 66; Gordon, supra note 160.
The IRD's Customer Charter is not comparable to the Australian Charter, and,
furthermore, its continued existence in its current form appears to be in doubt.
186.
An alternative label would be providing details of the "Commissioner's
obligations" with respect to taxpayers.
187.
Tax Administration Act, 1994 (N.Z.).
188.
Taxation Review Authorities Act, 1994 (N.Z.).
189.
See, e.g., Tax Administration Act, 1994 § 6(2) (N.Z.) concerning the
Commissioner's obligation of protecting the integrity of the tax system and § 6A(2)
and (3) concerning collecting the highest net revenue over time.
190.
See Tax Administration Act, 1994, §§ 81-89 (N.Z.). It should be noted
that New Zealand taxpayers do not currently have access to the information the
IRD has on them. See Slane, supra note 60, at 13.
See also Rodney Hide,
Taxpayers Should be Able to Inspect Their Own Files, NAT'L Bus. REV. (Auckland),
June 18, 1999, at 25. However, the Commissioner is proposing to issue a
Standard Practice Statement as to how a taxpayer may access their personal
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audits, including notification procedures and limitations on the
Commissioner's search and seizure powers; 19 1 a non-judicially
focused dispute resolution process, including explanations, limits
on assessment periods, and a discovery process; 19 2 the right to
counsel and to confidentiality of information; 193 the right to
record meetings and to have adjudications recorded; 19 4 a process
of hearings and appeals' 195 and rights and obligations with
19 6
respect to interest, penalties, and payment of tax.
Development of a formal document setting out taxpayers'
rights would be a positive first step in providing taxpayers with
an accessible way to get to know their rights, a situation that
should be a guaranteed right in itself. Nevertheless, knowledge
gained through a formal document without statutory support for
the "legal" rights therein may prove ineffectual if these rights
cannot be enforced. Other modifications, including removal of
the obligation to pay at least half of the tax in dispute, will bring
New Zealand into line with the generally accepted international
position outlined in this article.
Formalism, however, is not the sole mechanism for providing
guarantees to taxpayers in the form of certain rights. For
instance, in the case of New Zealand, the current informality
provides sufficient administrative protection if a strong argument
can be mounted that there is no need for specific legislative
protection (such as a covenant) because there is no real risk that
abuses or erosion of rights will eventuate.
New Zealand
administrators and government officials, either intentionally or
through their inaction, support the contention that informality
expressed through administrative practices currently provides all

information and when such information will be withheld. See FEC, supra note 60,
paras. 144-55.
191.
SeeTax Administration Act, 1994, §§ 16-19 (N.Z.); see also id. pt. VI.
192. See id. pts. V, VA, VIIIA.
193. See id. § 20 (dealing with legal professional privilege in addition to
privilege at common law).
194. This is accepted as an administrative practice, although TRA decision
recording is governed by the Taxation Review Authorities Act and the New Zealand
High Court Rules and Procedures. One exception is the small claims division of
the TRA, see Tax Review Authorities Act 1996, § 13B, where discussions are not

published and are frequently oral only.
195,

See Tax Administration Act, 1994, pt. VIII (N.Z.); Taxation Review

Authorities Act, 1994 (N.Z.); High Court Rules and Procedures. Generally, the
onus of proof is on the taxpayer (except for alleged criminal offences), and the
taxpayer must prove on the balance of probabilities that the Commissioner is
incorrect. There is a proposal to reverse this onus, to reflect the recent U.S.
development in TBR3, see, e.g., Greenbaum (1998), supra note 50, at 371, but it
has been rejected by the Government and FEC. See FEC, supra note 60, paras.
104-43.
196. See Tax Administration Act, 1994, pts. VII, IX, XI (N.Z.).
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need to formalize
of the necessary protection and that there is no
1 97
the practice through statutory entrenchment.
Nonetheless, there is a strong argument that New Zealand
taxpayers are not provided with sufficient protection from

One example of the abuse that can occur in New Zealand is that of the
197.
Henderson case. See HENDERSON, supra note 58. This case indicates that the
New Zealand system appears to lack sufficient redress for taxpayers who are
taken advantage of by administrators (or by the system) compared to civil law
nations, since there appears to be no avenue open to Henderson other than
through the public display of the revenue authority's "dirty laundry." Id. In most
instances, taxpayers would be unwilling to publicize their tax affairs in this
manner when such abuse arises. Therefore, the extent of such abuse is not able
to be determined on the publicly available evidence since tax affairs remain
confidential as between the taxpayer and the IRD. See id.
A further instance of a recent debacle-with implications for New Zealand
taxpayers generally and for selected wealthy taxpayers that are alleged to have
exploited the tax system and failed to meet their obligations and much greater
ramifications than the Henderson episode alone-is the Wine-Box Inquiry. This
incident involved millions of dollars routed through the Cook Islands' tax haven in
order to gain tax credits for 'tax paid" in the Cook Islands against New Zealand
tax due and "cloaking the transactions with secrecy. Id. The ensuing debates
and allegations over tax fraud verses tax avoidance and allegations of IRD
incompetence have been the subject of on-going litigation. Id. This incident was
at last resolved following continuing court appeals, the most recent being the
successful judicial review action taken by Hon. Winston Peters against the
Commission of Inquiry, Sir Ronald Davison. See Peters v. Davison, 19 NZTC
15,391 (also available at <http://www.cch.co.nz/tax>). The High Court bench of
two justices found that the Commission of Inquiry concluded with respect to the
Magnum transaction by way of several fundamental errors of law. See generally
id. Consequently, the Commission of Inquiry was not entitled to find that there
was no evidence of fraud or incompetence by the IRD or Serious Fraud Office
(SFO). Indeed, the Court was of the view that there was strong evidence of fraud
and incompetence, but that an action for judicial review prevented the court from
concluding as such. This decision followed a unanimous decision of the Court of
Appeal to allow a challenge to the Wine-Box Commissioner's findings. Peters v.
Davison, 11999] 2 NZLR 164. For a discussion of the Commission of Inquiry's
report, see Adrian J. Sawyer, The Wine-Box Inquiry: Never Mind the Findings but
What About the Recommendations?, 52 BULL. INT' FISCAL DOCUMENTATION 58
(1998).
Calls have been made for a further investigation into the behavior of IRD
officials in the context of accusations of inappropriate use of fear tactics and
intimidating taxpayers in order to retrieve debts. See Minister Warns on Taxpayer
Privacy, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, visited Mar. 3, 1999; Matthew Brockett, Parliament
to Probe IRD, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Mar. 4, 1999; ParliamentLaunches Probe into
IRD, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Mar. 18, 1999, at 9.

Early indications are that there is

See IRD Admits Secrecy Slip:
substance to at least some of the allegations.
Mistakes Made, Says Head, supra note 152, at 11. A further example of this
alleged heavy-handed approach is the announcement that 16 South Island firms
would be liquidated or bankrupt-a significant number well outside the average
number of pending liquidations at a given time-with many unaware of the
proceedings when contacted by members of the press. See Cullen Smith, IRD May
Liquidate 16 Firms, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Mar. 13, 1999, at 1.
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1 98
potential abuse-and in several instances, actual abuse.
Notwithstanding the comfort administrators may attempt to
promote through the apparent stability of the current practice of
informality, an Executive-dominated unicameral Parliament
without the democratic support of the general population may
repeal or erode administrative practices and ordinary legislation.
A formalized approach is less likely to allow taxpayers' rights to
be subrogated than would an informal approach and a
benevolent Executive. For instance, although not strictly a tax
matter, in October 1998 the New Zealand Government
unilaterally decreed that state pensions will fall from a
guaranteed sixty-five percent of the average wage to sixty percent
over several years. 19 9
New Zealand as a nation is typically viewed as being
relatively homogenous, although this has dramatically altered
following the expansive immigration policies of the late 1980s and
early 1990s, creating a more culturally and ethnically diverse
nation containing many vulnerable minorities. New Zealand,
founded on a partnership between the indigenous Maori and the
Crown as represented in the Treaty of Waitangi, 20 0 boasts the city

198.

Revenue authority personnel in New Zealand reflect the lack of

protection for taxpayers and the ongoing failure to adequately review the IRD,
since many of the IRD's staff are failing to meet their obligations to file a return300 in 1996 (approximately 10% of total IRD staff), with 70 not having filed a
return for several years, although they were required to do so. While at least 300
staff are reported as not paying their tax on time, yet the IRD's enforcement effort
cannot be described as being 'ax' for ordinary taxpayers. See Staff Returns
Become a Taxing Problem, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Jan. 18, 1999, at 2. One
prominent New Zealand politician is reported as saying this appalling state of
affairs is an example of how IRD staff were "thumbing their noses" at the
requirement to file tax returns. See id. The unpopularity of the IRD generally has
been confirmed with the release of a report summarizing taxpayer (IRD customer)
attitudes from surveys over 12 years (1986 to 1998). See Report Confirms
Unpopularity of IRD with Public, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Jan. 6, 1999, at 3. Major
themes include: a belief that the tax system is unfair, and the IRD and
Government are inefficient; taxpayers fear the IRD and are anxious about dealing
with it; taxpayers feel powerless in their dealings with the IRD; and many feel that
the IRD treats them as guilty until proven innocent. See id.
199. More correctly, the major political constituent of the government, the
National Party, made the decision. The original proposal from the National Party
was for a reduction to 55% of the average wage, and, had it not been for several
independent Members of Parliament that currently lend support refusing to
support this lower level, the fate facing current recipients of pensions would have
been worse. In 1988 the New Zealand state pension was 89.5% of the average
wage, with New Zealand governments since 1990 controlled by the National Party.
See Super Move Adds to Elderly Anxiety, MARLBOROUGH EXPRESS, Oct. 1998 (on file
with author). Furthermore, since pensions in New Zealand are paid from general
tax revenues and not a separate fund, such as in the United States, pensions are
directly related to the level of tax revenues and tax policy.
200. Founding Documents of New Zealand, Treaty of Waitangi, Feb. 6, 1840
(English and Maori text versions). For an excellent discussion of the surrounding
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with the largest population of Pacific Island ethnicity in the world,
namely Auckland. 2 0 1 Large portions of the residents of other New
Zealand cities are of Pacific Island, European, and Asian descent
and ethnicity as a result of relatively nonrestrictive immigration
policies. It should not come as a surprise that immigrants may
expect protection similar to that available in their home
Union.
especially those from the European
countries,
Furthermore, the rights of the indigenous Maori have received
formal legal protection. 20 2 Is this the first sign that the tide is
changing?
Dominance of the pure free market paradigm or philosophy
at the expense of consumer rights, pensioner rights, and minority
groups is a far cry from pre-1984 New Zealand. 20 3 Only the
humane nature of the Executive branch of the government and
the benevolence of administrators prevents serious abuse and
erosion of rights. The popular press, however, would suggest that
through a process of erosion and by stealth, protection of the less
wealthy and vulnerable (extending to taxpayers in these
categories) is overdue following the gradual and subtle decay of
20 4
standards and previously expected rights and entitlements.

constitutional issues of the Treaty of Waitangi, see PAUL G. McHUGH, THE MAORI
MAGNA CARTA: NEW ZEALAND LAW AND THE TREATY OF WAITANGI (1991).
201.
See generally Jack H. Nagel, ConstitutionalReform and Social Difference

in New Zealand, 4 CARDOZO J. INT'L & CoMP. L. 373 (discussing the important
constitutional change in New Zealand from a first past the post (FPP) to a mixed
member proportional (MMP) electoral system and the impact of these changes on
the indigenous Maori people).
Protection is provided through the Treaty of Waitangi Act, 1975 (N.Z.),
202.
that was substantially amended in 1985 to extend claims back as far as the
signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, beyond the original date for claims
which was limited to legislation and policy current as at the original date of
enactment in 1975. See MCHUGH, supranote 200, at 309-11.
203.
The economic and social restructuring, commenced with the fourth
Labour Government and continued by the new National Government in 1990
when it took office, radically altered the fabric of New Zealand society. For two
diametrically opposed perspectives on this restructuring, compare ROGER
DOUGLAS,

UNFINISHED BUSINESS

(1994) and ROGER DOUGLAS,

COMPLETING THE

CIRCLE (1996), with JANE KELSEY, THE NEW ZEALAND EXPERIMENT: A WORLD MODEL
FOR STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT? (1997). Hon. Roger Douglas was the Minister of
Finance in the Labour Government from 1984 to 1988 and instigated most of
these changes. He is now the Chair of the right-wing political party, ACT
(Association of Consumers and Taxpayers), of which Rodney Hide is a prominent
Member of Parliament who has been undertaking a "crusade" against the IRD.
Kelsey, a professor of law who holds a chair at the University of Auckland, N.Z.,
emphasizes the social upheavals of the period of reform and restructuring since
1984.
A call for a clean up of the IRD and its "atrocious powers and behavior"
204.
has been made by a prominent New Zealand politician (Rodney Hide), following
revelations of the consequences of how small debts can mushroom. See Jocelyn
Bromby, MP Targets 'Atrocious' IRD, CHRISTCHURCH PRESS, Feb. 10, 1999, at 11;
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Consequently, the time has come to provide for greater
protection for New Zealand taxpayers and, for that matter, New
Zealanders in general before the informal administrative practice
and weak legislative paradigm becomes so eroded that effective
protection is lost through the growing decay and subrogation of
basic rights and freedoms, including taxpayers' rights. New
Zealand, through its embrace of globalization and pure free
market ideology (or liberalism), has exposed itself to the practices
of the world (both desirable and undesirable); should this current
ideology continue to reign, then, as a nation, New Zealand runs
the risk of winning the "race to the bottom." It risks bringing
upon itself the associated consequences
for both taxpayers' rights
20 5
and human rights in general.
To respond to the question posed in the title to this article, I
believe that I have made the case that New Zealand taxpayers
have been short-changed in comparison with the civil and
common law nations reviewed in this article from a legal
(formalistic) perspective and, more recently, from an informal
point of view.
The absence of a constitution protecting
fundamental human rights, promoting only minimalist legal
protection of rights through statutory means (which can be
repealed by an ordinary majority of the unicameral
Parliament),20 6 and the poor attempt at providing a charter (the
Statement of Principles 20 7 and the more recent Customer
Charter),20 8 all require rectification as soon as possible. If action

is not taken, the worse-case scenario may eventuate-the rise of

a government that ignores and overrides not only fundamental
taxpayers'

rights

(which are

currently

provided

through

Clausen, supra note 162. The politician cites by way of an example how one
taxpayer's small debt to the IRD grew 800% within a year (from NZ $8,000 to NZ
$64,000), with the consequence being the need to mortgage his house. See
Bromby, supra, at 11.
Many others are less fortunate, normally suffering
bankruptcy at the hands of the IRD (or committing suicide first), the result of
receiving "intimidating and inflammatory letters" from the IRD, falling to seek
advice promptly, and topped off by the effects of the new penalties regime. See id.
at 11.

205.

This statement should not be read as though I am not in favor of the

free market approach and its general philosophy. Rather, I believe that greater
statutory and constitutional protection for the weaker members of New Zealand
society is paramount and essential to having an equitable as well as efficient
market place and living environment, including the provision of an adequate
"safety net" for those that would otherwise fall victim. For a discussion on the
possible future directions of taxpayers' rights, see generally Duncan Bentley,
FutureDirections, in TAXPAYERS' RIGHTS, supranote 27, at 380.
206.
Further protection is provided through ratification of international
treaties and conventions, although ratification may be withdrawn by the
unicameral Parliament. See generally Flaherty & Lally-Green, supranote 7.
207.
See INLAND REVENUE DEPARTMENT, supranote 148.
208.
See id.
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administrative enforcement accompanied by some legislative
provisions), but also fundamental human rights. The current
legislative environment would facilitate such a government; it is
only the political will and the current diversity of political parties
under the MMP system that is preventing such tragic
circumstances from developing.
Furthermore, the gradual erosion of rights, both
administrative and legal, through the dominance and infatuation
with the pure free market paradigm, underlies the need for
urgent attention. Is it not better to prevent the undesirable from
happening rather than resting in what may be a false comfort
that a satisfactory level of taxpayers' rights will remain through
administrative convention and informality?
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Appendix C

Inquiry Into the Powers and
Operations of the Inland Revenue
Department,
Summary of Recommendations
(1) The Tax Administration Act 1994 (TAA) be amended to provide a clear fouryear time bar in relation to all taxes except where the Commissioner of Inland
Revenue has reasonable grounds to suspect a return to be fraudulent or
willfully misleading.
(2) The burden of proof remain with the taxpayer, but that consideration be given
to establishing a "test" for the Inland Revenue Department to meet to ensure
that only properly calculated and substantiated amended assessments are
issued to complying taxpayers.
(3) Section 81 of the TAA be amended to allow for access to personal information,

(4)
(5)

(6)
(7)

(8)

but that this provision be linked to requests for information by the individual
concerned under privacy principal 6.
An electronic footprint be inserted in the Inland Revenue Department's files to
record who accesses individual taxpayers' details.
The Inland Revenue Department review its approach in respect of the care
and management provisions in light of recent Court of Appeal decisions, with
a view to amending its internal guidelines to make it clear the Commissioner
of Inland Revenue can exercise discretion on a case by case basis.
The procedures for monitoring the delegation of the powers of the
Commissioner of Inland Revenue be reviewed.
With respect to the penalties regime:
a past record of "good behavior" be taken into account when deciding whether
to impose a penalty
the Inland Revenue exercise a greater degree of flexibility when applying
shortfall penalties
shortfall penalties not apply when it its determined that the taxpayer has
made an inadvertent error.
The Inland Revenue Department develop a systems audit methodology in
order to assess whether taxpayers are adopting a reasonable standard of
care.

1.
The recommendations
Committee (FEC) are available
inquiry.html>.

of the Finance and Expenditure Select
at <http://www.gp.co.nz/wooc/i-papers/ird-
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(9) The Inland Revenue Department reinforce both publicly and internally that if
a taxpayer or adviser has not interpreted legislation a penalty for
unacceptable interpretation cannot apply.

(10) The Government review the process by which assessments can be challenged,
placing particular emphasis on assessing the merits of establishing a time
limit on the Commissioner of Inland Revenue when addressing a taxpayer's
Notice of Response.
(11) The method by which use of money interest is calculated be reviewed to
determine whether changes to the Interest rates for overpayments and
underpayments to reduce the differential between the rates are appropriate.
(12) The Government review the whole area of write-offs and in doing so consider:
whether there should be a time limit on the reinstatement of a debt
whether, if the present policy is to continue, the term "write-off' should be
replaced by wording that more accurately describes the policy (for example,
.provisional write-off")
whether it is necessary for the write-off provisions to be contained in the
Inland Revenue Acts.
(13) The Inland Revenue Department issue clear directions to taxpayers as to their
options, rights, and obligations with respect to repayment arrangements.
(14) The ministerial approval thresholds for installment arrangements and
remissions be removed, but that the Commissioner of Inland Revenue be
required to provide a regular report to the Minister of Revenue outlining
applications for remissions and installments in excess of $100,000.
(15) The Government review the preferential status of the Inland Revenue
Department in liquidations.
(16) The Inland Revenue Department re-establish a problem resolution service
with experienced personnel who are committed to customer satisfaction
outcomes.
(17) The Inland Revenue Department ensure that the problem resolution service,
once established, is well publicized.
(18) The Inland Revenue Department advise all complainants, dissatisfied by the
results of an internal inquiry, of their rights to appeal to an external agency.
(19) The Government establish a specialist tax adviser position within the Officer
of the Ombudsman, with appropriate resources, to investigate matters of tax
administration by the Inland Revenue Department.
(20) The Inland Revenue Department investigate ways to preserve over the counter
services in areas where it is closing offices, particularly in isolated areas.
(21) The Inland Revenue Department enhance its monitoring of telephone services
to ensure greater timeliness and accuracy of responses and that the
department identity and remedy any skills deficiencies as a matter of priority.
(22) The Inland Revenue Department take steps to enhance the timeliness and
quality of its responses to written correspondence, and that the performance
standard in the 1999/2000 Purchase Agreement of dealing with all
correspondence within eight weeks of receipt be reviewed.
(23) The Government consider moving the responsibility for drafting tax legislation
back to the Parliamentary Counsel Office.
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(24) The Government consider whether establishing a board of directors to provide
an oversight of the Inland Revenue Department's operation of its powers is
desirable.
(25) The Inland Revenue Department Implement, as a matter of priority, a
nationally consistent training program aimed at improving communication
and customer service skills.
(26) The Inland Revenue Department consider implementing a program along
similar lines to the Business and Parliament Trust, which would enable staff
to build relationship with, and have greater exposure *to, the business
community.
(27) The Inland Department establish a taxpayers' charter to outline to taxpayers
their rights and obligations in respect of the tax system.

